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3There is a significant current within biblical exegesis, both contemporary and ancient, to
either ignore or deny the socio-political implications of the Gospel narrative. Whether this is the
result of a concerted effort to domesticate the message of the text or a simple misinterpretation of
the text, the consequences have been drastic. For example, Christology has been reduced to a
conceptual paradigm by which we explain the humanity and divinity of Christ. In significant
ways it is philosophically abstract and ethically nebulous. This misreading of Jesus' identity and
ministry has consequently affected our understanding of the Church and its political identity.
John Howard Yoder argues that this perspective is caused by a variety of traditional assumptions.
Whether one sees "the ethic of Jesus (as) an ethic for an 'Interim" or that "the nature of Jesus'
message was ahistorical by definition," the result is the same: an inability and unwillingness to
acknowledge the ethical/political demands of Jesus' ministry and crucifixion.' He writes.
It results from this consideration of the type of thinking and teaching Jesus was
doing, that it cannot have been his intention - or at least we cannot take it to have
been his achievement - to provide any precise guidance in the field of the ethics.
His apocalypticism and his radical monotheism may teach us to be modest; his
personalism my teach us to cherish the values of face-to-face relationships, but as
to the stuff of our decision-making, we shall have to have other sources of help.^
Beginning with the conversion ofConstantine, the Church has been progressively shorn
of this eschatological and Christological distinctiveness, such that it does not see itself as a
unique, set apart people with its own political ethos. Instead, it has partnered with empire and
' John Howard Yoder, The Politics ofJesus (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Pubhshing Co., 1994), 6-8.
2
Ibid, 8.
^
By "empire" I refer to both the historical institution, represented for example by first century
Rome, as well as the political structure which often times places the civic structures over and
above its own citizenry. More importantly, "empire" is most properly understood as a "body"
which seeks to absorb every other independent, particular "body" - including the Church. The
"empire" understands itself as the locus ofhistory and will consent very little dissent or
autonomy. As such, I use the term "empire" both historically and symbolically.
4made itself a state commodity. The Church fundamentally abandoned its biblical character.
When the Church has failed to account for the ethical demands of its Christology, it has
concurrently overlooked the inherent theo-political themes of the biblical text. This particular
shift away from the intended structure of the Church has occurred throughout the centuries and
has dominated the development of our distinctive American ecclesiology. Inheritors of an "anti-
apocalyptic" ecclesiology, the American Church is incapable of recognizing its own narrative
tradition as pointing to an incamational, alternative polls overagainst the secular state.
It is my contention that a shift in Christological interpretation, biblical and historical
exegesis, and political language will force us to reformulate how we understand the Church's
relationship to the secular state. As a result, we will recognize that there is inherent conflict
between the two, arising from their distinctive understanding of history and theology. Drawing
on the tradition of the Radical Reformation and certain strains of orthodox Catholicism, I hope to
demonstrate that Christian ecclesiology should be, in genuine imitation of its Lord and fidelity to
its text, an incarnation of a particular theological politics. Moreover, I seek to show that within
our contemporary context, this position is best communicated with an anarchistic rhetoric.
Matthew's Gospel in the Imperial Context
The Radical Reformation perspective did not develop within a void, but rather articulated
what it saw as a closer fidelity to the biblical narrative. Indeed, both the Hebrew Scriptures and
the New Testament portray God as inherently opposed to authoritarian, centralized political
order. Consider the Matthean narrative. According to Warren Carter, "Matthew's Gospel
contests and resists the Roman Empire's claims to sovereignty over the world. It sustains an
alternative community of disciples of Jesus in anticipation of the coming triumph of God's
5Empire over all things, including the destruction ofRome's empire.""* This confrontation occurs
on two levels. One, it is a "social challenge" which presents a radically different, and inverted,
picture ofwhat human community should be. The text speaks of the invasive ministry ofChrist
as the calling together of an entirely new creation - the reconstitution of a particular people that,
by their mere existence, stand in opposition to the dominant social structures of the period. Two,
Matthew's Gospel offers a "theological challenge" to Roman imperial theology.^ A critical
aspect of first century Roman culture was the insistence that the emperor was god. The civic
authority, contained in one person, was seen as the manifestation of the gods' rule. He was the
presence of the divine among the people and exercised all legitimate authority and sovereignty.
As such, the Roman aristocracy engaged in an extended campaign ofpolitical propaganda,
continually seeking to portray itself as the vehicle ofGod's will. The emergence of a Jewish
prophet claiming to be sent from God was an existential threat. The Matthean narrative is
essentially one of confrontation between the reign of God as incarnated in Christ and the Roman
"imperial theology" ofmilitant aristocracy. It is a cosmic declaration that the true sovereign has
inaugurated his reign in history.
Carter describes the Roman imperial system as based on a "legionary economy."^
Through a fixed system ofmartial law and oligarchic economy, a small group of citizens
determined the fate of the people. He argues that the aristocratic hierarchy "did not rule by
democratic consent but by the ability to enforce their will on most of the population. With
control over the primary source of land and its production, this group exercised great political
^ Warren Carter, Matthew and Empire: Initial Explorations (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press
International, 2001), 1.
^Ibid.
^Ibid, 10.
6control and acquired vast wealth for themselves through taxes, rents, and tributes."^ This system
of exploitation and corruption benefited roughly ten percent of the population. The remaining
ninety percent, peasants and artisans, were forced to sustain this systemic injustice. As a result,
"the great majority of peasants who lived in the various agrarian societies of the past apparently
lived at, or close to, the subsistence level. With close to seventy percent of their crop supply
confiscated through taxes, survival was a daily struggle. The imperial tax system "meant that
many peasants lived constantly close to famine. . .with poor nutrition, poor health, endless hard
work, and perpetual vulnerability."' It is important to note that these taxes were not used for the
benefit of society as a whole. Rather, the aristocratic notion of a "proprietary state" meant that
"the state (was) something to be used not for the maximal common good but for one's personal
benefit, and in turn, for the good of one's heirs.
The Roman elite saw themselves as owners of the political system, and thereby in control
of its direction. More insidiously, they presented these repressive taxes, more accurately
described as assets of the oligarchy, as the cost of peace and security. Without the taxes the
people would be left unprotected, yet because of them they could not survive. In an effort to
fortify this tax system, the ruling elite established an army whose "reputation functioned to
intimidate and repress would-be opponents."" Because this particular system of taxafion and
patronage was the source of their comfort and prestige, the aristocracy willingly employed their
military might. Any threat, real or perceived, was crushed with ruthless force and efficiency,
making any kind of dissent or revolufionary protest impossible. This was the socio-polifical
^ Ibid, 9.
^Ibid, 18.
' Ibid, 47.
'�Ibid, 13.
" Ibid.
7context ofMatthew's Gospel. It was a society of inequality, injustice, exclusion, domination,
and coerced compliance.'^ Even more so, the elite sought to construct a theological justification
for this oppressive system. It is this distorted theo-political vision presented by the Roman
aristocracy that Matthew's Gospel sees as an apostate distortion of its own narrative.
Part of the correlation between religious and civic practice in ancient Rome is contextual
in nature. Unlike the perceived separation between "church" and "state" in contemporary
America, the religious and public spheres in imperial Rome were identical. "Religious rituals
and theological words were used by emperors and their officials, as well as by loyal supporters in
Rome and in the provinces, to evoke 'a picture of the relationship between the emperor and the
gods' and 'impose a definition of the world.' In these presentations, Rome and the emperor
manifested the sovereignty, presence, will, and blessings of the gods among human beings."'^
Thus, in an act of "imperial spin" the actions of the Roman elite were presented as divinely
sanctioned. Carter contends that the imperial ruler was able to employ a variety of propaganda
tools to perpetuate this image. From infrastructure such as "decorated gates, arches, columns,
statues, and buildings" to "liturgical practices such as prayers, vows, and sacrifices" the
theological claims of the empire were disseminated throughout society.'"* Every citizen was
inundated with imperial propaganda.
Matthew's Gospel is acutely aware of this pervasive message. Its narrative is addressed
to and centers on "an audience familiar with imperial presence and theology. . .the 'power of
images' ensured imperial theology was known in Antioch through the residency of the governor
and his staff, visits of emperors, and the large number of soldiers, buildings, coins. . .temples and
'2 Ibid, 10.
'^ Ibid, 20.
Ibid, 29.
8rituals. . .[as such] these human and material billboards advertised Rome's sovereignty and will,
destined by the gods to rule over all."'^ Society is structured in such a way that "community" is
a shadow of its intended purpose. A tyrannical elite uses violence and fear to quell any dissent
from its narrative of divine commission. As such, "God" (or the gods) is seen as preternatural
versions ofhumanity. Into this environment emerged Jesus Christ and his apocalyptic message
ofGod's sovereignty and sacrificial love.
Carter argues that central to the theo-political message of the Gospel is the formation of a
community distinct from the Roman system. Drawing on the scholarship of Michael Mann, Luke
Johnson, and Rodney Stark, he asserts that common to all three approaches "is the recognition
that Christianity provided an alternative communal experience and set ofpractices that were
inclusive, egalitarian, and merciful."'^ In this way, they mirrored similar social groups.
However, while trade and funerary organizations offered an opportunity for withdrawal from the
imperial system, they did not communicate an explicitly theological identification. In contrast,
the Matthean Gospel presented an alternative socio-political entity grounded within a specific
theological framework. To those questions ofbelonging and citizenship, Matthew "offers a
theological answer asserting God's sovereignty."'^ Thus, it asserts that creation is not a
commodity and social value is not determined by wealth or status. Rather, humanity is to be
valued and nurtured because it is a reflection and gift of the creator. Such a claim, proclaimed
throughout the gospel, serves as a constant threat to the Roman imperial system. The Empire is
declared false and the "Christological community" is asserted as truth. This final point is critical
to Carter's thesis. The theological altemafive presented in the Matthean text is not generically
Ibid, 46.
'^Ibid, 51.
Ibid.
9monotheistic or Jewish. Rather, it is foundationally Christocentric in character and mission.
Again, what set it apart is the confession of Christ as Lord. Because it claims to follow the
incarnate God, its identity is fundamentally tied to the person of Jesus. Christ is thus the focal
point of the God's Reign. His incarnation provides the community with its sense ofmission and
identity. Carter writes, "The Gospel's presentation of Jesus contributes to an alternative
understanding of the world and life in that it subverts imperial theology and legitimates a
community with an alternative worldview and lifestyle or set ofpractices. That is, this
Christology, the presentation of Jesus as agent of God's sovereignty is part of the Gospel's
theological and social challenge to the empire."'^ The "kingdom ofGod," the cosmic
interruption into history, is revealed in Christ and cannot be understood apart from him. As
such, this revelation is two-fold. It exhibits the character ofGod and the nature of genuine
community, as a reflection of that character. For Carter, this specific Christological dissent fi-om
the empire should be understood in four ways: sovereignty, presence, agency, and societal well-
being.
The Matthean genealogy of Jesus encapsulates the entirety of Israel's history. It projects
onto the text a weight of importance, distinctiveness, and authority. Rather than representing a
simple genealogical presentation or historical summary, the Matthean Gospel "views this history
in a Christological perspective in that the coming of Jesus is the decisive event in a history that
involves a whole host of characters beginning with Abraham. Christ is God's revolutionary
agent. He is the divine intervention into history. And he has come not simply for the Jewish
people, but for all ofhumanity. This declaration serves as an apocalyptic rebuke to the Roman
Empire. It signals that "God supervises human history. . .and that God's purposes, not Rome's
Ibid, 57.
Ibid, 60.
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are being worked out in human history, and that those purposes run through Israel not Rome."
The Roman Empire operated under the belief that it was the force and energy behind historical
progression. Rome controlled and determined the direction the world would take. It was
sovereign and divinely ordained. The "reign of heaven", manifested in the words and actions of
Jesus, is therefore "God's 'No' to Jupiter's claim of a Roman Empire that has dominion without
end."'' Moreover, the Gospel narrative presents the Roman Empire as the temporal
manifestation of Satan's power. The claims of divine derivation with regards to imperial
theology are thus challenged and shown to be false. Carter cites the temptation scene in Matthew
4. He declares that Satan's offer of control over the "kingdoms and empires of the world" is
"astounding [because] it expresses Satan's claim to control the world's empires, to have them at
his disposal and under his rule."^^ This is not simply a claim about the specific political power of
first century Rome. Rather,
The extraordinary thing is that according to these texts, all powers, all the power
and glory of the kingdoms, all that has to do with politics and political authority,
belongs to the devil. It has all been given to him and he gives it to whom he
wills. . .We may thus say that among Jesus' immediate followers and in the first
Christian generation political authorities - what we call the state - belonged to the
devil and those who held power received it from him.^^
In the Matthean context then, the Roman Empire is representative ofboth all imperial authority
and demonic power. That Jesus rebukes and resists Satan's temptation is indicative of his own
sovereignty. Imperial power is symbolic of every political concentration of power. It is a force
ofmorbid oppression operating under the aegis of its self-proclaimed divinity. In its wake it
leaves chaos, destruction and instability.
2� Ibid, 60-61.
2' Ibid, 61.
22 Ibid, 63.
2^
Jacques Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1988), 58.
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John Howard Yoder offers a similar reading of this passage. While his interpretation
does not center on the notion of a "Satanic cult," he does argue that the text speaks of "the
idolatrous character ofpolitical power hunger and nationalism."^'* Political power, whether
manifested as empire or monarchy is a rebellion against God's will. It is the systematic
assumption that God's sovereignty is a metaphysical inconsequentiality. Government may be
biblically justifiable as indicafive of order overagainst chaos, but its manifestafions are often a
symbol of idolatrous disunity. For both Yoder and Carter, the temptation scene reveals that the
reign ofGod is at hand and the empires of the world are powerless to stop it. In the person of
Jesus we are witness to the presence of God.
Christ does not merely declare God's sovereignty over creation and history. He is the
physical manifestation of the divine presence. As such, Jesus' ministry and life become
normative for how humanity should understand community. Carter points to chapter 18, verse
20 of the text, in which Jesus "teaches his disciples about their communal relationships and
25
responsibilities that derive from God's empire/kingdom." He writes, "There is an implicit
contrast with the empire in this scene. The verse claims that divine presence is not found in the
dominating, excluding, hierarchical society formed by Rome's militaristic and economically
26
exploitative elite, but in the inclusive community of disciples." Carter expands on this
interpretation, claiming that the "great commission" ofMatt. 28 is an "explicit statement about
divine presence."^^ Both of these verses are vital in understanding the importance of the Church
with regards to both biblical exegesis and theological reflecfion. For Carter, Jesus' manifestation
of divine presence can only be understood within the context of ecclesial discipleship. It is not
2^
Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 26.
2^
Carter, Matthew and Empire, 65.
2^ Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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simply enough to claim that the incarnation is a divine incursion into history. Rather, this
statement must be read in its Gospel context and appropriated to how we understand
discipleship. The divine presence, manifested in the historical incarnation of Jesus, is
comprehensively transformative for how we understand both individuality and community. It is
the declaration of a new creation, beginning with a marginalized group of Jews. Thus, Carter is
correct in claiming that Matthean Christology is normative for the Christian community. Christ
in not only the revelation of God's will for human relationships, whether at the micro- or macro-
level, his ministry is a rebuke of imperial power and oppression.
Carter provides a cogent interpretation of the biblical narrative as a confrontation
between the demonic power of imperial theology and the reign of heaven present in Christ. In
doing so, he establishes the scriptural background for John Howard Yoder's historical analysis.
If Carter and Yoder are correct in their interpretations, and if the biblical texts offer a radical
theo-political Christology, then we can ill afford to ignore how such a perspective affects our
understanding of ecclesiology. For Yoder the relationship between ethics and community is best
understood within the specific tradition of the Radical Reformation. Indeed, his theo-political
perspective is shaped by its fidelity to the particular history of the Anabaptists.
History Through an Anabaptist Lens
Radical Reformation ecclesiology is grounded in the biblical concept of "holiness as
otherness." In The Priestly Kingdom, Yoder describes his task as arguing "that the stance which
has been variously labeled as 'peace church,' 'minority,' 'non-established,' 'radical reformation'
is closer to the gospel and more properly to be recognized as the imperative under which
13
Christians stand than are the major alternatives. "^^ As such, the radical reformation most clearly
embodies the Church "in (its) pre-Constantinian significance... [a] visible [community];
identified by baptism, discipline, morality, and martyrdom."^' This alternative body stood in
contrast to the world, indicative not of creation in the abstract, but rather understood as "the
fallen form of the same, no longer conformed to the creative intent."^� Consequentially, the
"church" and "world" (represented by the state) are seen in conflict and contrast. Because the
"church" embodied a tangible alternative to the world as it was constituted "it is self-
evident. . .that the church's members do not normally belong in the service of the world and a
3 1fortiori in that of the pagan state." Yoder begins with the assumption that the Church is
inherently distinct from the surrounding society. It is the source of God's movement in the
world and cannot be understood apart from its confessional identity. This original identification
was distorted with the 4 century conversion of Constantine.
The figure ofConstantine is not merely representative of a particular historical person or
his personal motivations and faith. Rather, formy own argument "Constantine" serves as the
symbol of a substantial temptation in Church history. Constantine represents the lure ofpower
and relevance that drew the Church away from its inherited margins and into the realm of
power.
^2 xhis epochal shift dramatically altered the nature of the Church's witness and
discipleship, such that it became something entirely unrecognizable. Thus, the Constantinian
shift distorted the Church's understanding of its own history. Again, imperial theology presumes
that the emperor is the agent ofGod's will and history. Constantine's conversion had
2^ John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press,
1984), 81.
2' John Howard Yoder, The Royal Priesthood (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1998), 56.
^� Ibid, 55
Ibid, 56.
^2 Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, 135.
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consequences regarding Christian eschatology, history, and metaphysics. I will here throughout
use the term "Constantine" to refer to both the individual and the effect.
A vital part ofRadical Reformation ecclesiology is its unique understanding of Christian
eschatology and discipleship. For those within the tradition, the "reign ofGod" is not
identifiable with the political program of a civic authority. First, it is, in the liturgical practices
ofworship, embodied in the Church who professes allegiance to Christ. Second, the kingdom of
God is marked by the tension of the eschatological "already/not yet" dichotomy. The Church is
the embodiment of God's apocalyptic incursion into his creation. Through its existential
confession, it declares that there is another sovereign that directs the course ofhistory. If
ecclesiology becomes the captive of imperial ideology, it fails to proclaim the Christological
alternative to the powers of the world. Ecclesiology is a cosmological community in allegiance
to God. Yoder writes that, prior to the conversion of Constantine "the apostolic church confessed
Jesus Christ as Lord; risen, ascended. . .over the not yet subdued kosmos.'"^^ Membership in this
community was determined not by birth or status, but rather by conviction and confession.^"* The
advent of the Constantinian age made it such that not only was being a Christian the "rule,"
rather than exception, but "God's governance ofhistory (was) empirically evident in the person
of the Christian ruler of the world. "^^ Faith in God's control and determining of history and
kosmos is replaced with a trust in the manifested reign of the temporal emperor. Constantine,
therefore, becomes the source of progress and history. This was the distortion of Christian
eschatology. Yoder writes, "Before Constantine, one knew as a fact of everyday experience that
there was a believing Christian community but one had to 'take it on faith' that God was
Ibid, 136.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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governing history." The Constantinian shift inverted this dynamic. Following his conversion,
the distinct community known as "Church" began to assimilate itself into the apparatus of the
empire, ft became increasingly difficult was to see the Empire and the Church as two separate
entities. Concurrently, it was now assumed that because the emperor was Christian, his rule
represented the earthly embodiment of God's will. Historically then, the narrative of the Church
shifted from the story of a particular people called out of the world, to the conquests and failures
of "dynasties."" Finally, Constantine represented the "victory ofmetaphysical dualism."^^ In
contrast to the normative ethical demands of apostolic discipleship, ethical discernment is
separated into two forms. The ethic of love or sacrifice is relegated to the personal or interior
sphere of life. Forgiveness and nonviolence are thus to be understood at the micro level. This
differentiation allowed both ruler and community to postulate a completely separate ethic for the
"outward world of structures."^' Violence could thus be justified in the name of security and
justice. Efficacy becomes determinative for political action and makes it such that status
becomes more important for community identity. Those in power will approach moral discourse
fi^om the perspective of dominion and success. They will see the "other" not as imago dei, but
rather as someone either to conquer or arrogate. In contrast, "minorities and the weak have
(alternative) languages for moral discourse - conscience, revelation, and covenant."'*^ In short,
the Constantinian shift changes the entire status of the Church fi-om a marginalized people of a
"God-for-us," to a partner of a despotic philosophical construction. The Church's place in
society was inverted.
Ibid, 137.
Ibid, 138.
Ibid, 140.
Ibid, 141.
Ibid, 140.
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For Yoder, status is important for how we both appropriate and situate ourselves in God's
movement in the world. It determines not only how we relate to one another, but how we
understand the nature ofpower and its structures. Perhaps more importantly, it determines how
we, as Christians, interpret scripture and tradition. For Yoder, the biblical narrative speaks of the
vital importance ofminority status. He writes, "To understand the perspective of Jeremiah and
Ezekiel, of for that matter of the records of the message of Jesus, many of our contemporaries do
not stop to take account ofwhat it contributes to the shape of the writer's ethical guidance, that
he is not assuming that his listeners dominate the society where they live.""*' For the Church in
power then, the ethical import of the scriptural text takes a completely different meaning. As the
empire or state's partner, "the assumption tends to be that in order to continue being a sovereign,
he needs to continue to act the way a (non-Christian) sovereign 'naturally' acts.""*^ Again,
effectiveness becomes the standard by which a supposed "Christian" ruler determines his
actions. Because the sovereign is seen as the "manager" of society and history, "the rightness
and wrongness ofbehavior can now be translated or interpreted in terms of good and bad
outcomes."'*^ Here again we see the eschatological impact on ethical discernment. Because
history is seen as the purview of the imperial power, the emperor is thus forced to relegate his
identity, and loyalty, in Christ to an interiorized morality. Indeed, majority status leads one into
a consequentialist calculation ofpolitical decisions. Yoder declares, "Only the person who
believes that the 'responsible use ofpower' from a position of domination is necessary in order
to be usefiil will then presuppose that the alternative is moral purity at the price of
41
42
43
Ibid, 82.
Ibid.
Ibid, 83.
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ineffectiveness."'*'* The Constantinian shift made it such that the Church abandons its position of
weakness for the power, audacity for complacency, and exile for privilege. This is never more
apparent than in the issue of violence and war.
The Radical Reformation understanding of ecclesial discipleship is inherently cruciform,
with the narrative of Jesus supplying the epistemological locus."*^ This Christological narrative is
most accurately viewed through the Cross. Yoder writes, "The cross is not a detour or a hurdle
on the way to the kingdom, nor is it even the way to the kingdom; it is the kingdom come.""*^ If
the reign ofGod proclaimed by Christ is nonresistant, then the identity of the people constituted
in his name most embody this character. Ecclesiology is for Yoder about a discipleship of
nonviolence. Thus, the Gospel narrative, eschatology, and ecclesiology must ultimately be
understood through the crucifixion. The Constantinian shift is disastrous because it neuters this
core component. The Church, voluntarily called together by God, is to imitate and embody this
theo-political identity."*^ The nonresistant, pacifistic theo-politics of Jesus are normative for his
Church and any effort to ignore or displace the believer's loyalty is idolatrous. Once again,
status and perspective is important. Ecclesiology is marked with voluntary discipleship, not
allegiance to a secular politics or national status. J. Denny Weaver expands on Yoder's claim
48
that the Church was now identified with "political loyalties." He provides an example of how
this repositioning affected our understanding ofwhat constitutes normative or orthodox
Christology.
Ibid, 96.
'^^ J. Denny Weaver, "Renewing Theology: The Way of John Howard Yoder (Musings Nicea to
September 1 1)" Fides et Historia XXXV (Summer/Fall 2003): 85.
Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 51.
Ibid: Yoder is clear that when he speaks of this imitation he refers not to Jesus' celibacy or
itinerant ministry. Rather, he argues that "only at one point, only on one subject - but then
consistently, universally - is Jesus our example: in his cross."
Weaver, 87.
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Weaver points to the Council ofNicaea and its theological contributions as examples of
this theological distortion. He writes, "The controversial question (over Nicaea and the New
Testament) understanding of Jesus is not whether or not there are differences, but whether those
differences are substantive.""*' The fundamental issue is how the Church's new status affected its
theological discernment. As a Church "in power" the bishops at Nicaea saw no substantial
difference between their own Christology and the Gospel narrative. As such, the picture of Jesus
presented in the New Testament is complimentary to the one systematically codified at Nicaea.
Weaver suggests an alternative understanding. He does not argue that Nicaean Christology is
incorrect or unimportant. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate how it was conditioned by its
historical contextual. It is indicative of both the Church's location within the historical Roman
Empire and also the effect that "imperial power" had on its perpsective. As with Yoder, Weaver
argues that Nicaea represents a shift from a narrative to an ontological Christological
identification. ^� The dependency on theoretical or philosophical language dramatically alters the
shape of the Church's social action. He writes,
A church identified with the social order is one whose ethical cues will come from
the social order - as illustrated by the church's acceptance of the emperor's
sword; and its way of describing Jesus will not challenge the identification with
the social order. A church that seeks to be oriented by the narrative of Jesus will
certainly have a different orientation than the social order, and will - at least on
occasion - challenge the social order.
If the Church is to imitate Christ then it matters a great deal how it understands Jesus. A
Christology based on the Gospel narrafive will focus on Christ as a dissident figure in opposition
to those in power. It will reflect the biblical narrative in which God is on the side of the weak
and poor. It will, in short, embody an "ecclesiology of incarnation."
Ibid, 89.
5� Ibid, 90.
Ibid.
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The effect of the Nicaean council is a truncation of this ethical core. It is, from an ethical
perspective, inadequate simply to state that Jesus is equally God and man. The generic nature of
52such categorization makes it possible to acquiesce to "imperial intervention." Such a
philosophical construct, void of any narrative context, produces a "blank" picture of Jesus.
Discussions about how to speak of Christ's divinity and humanity will inevitably be as abstract
as they are necessary. If the Church's identity is based on a philosophy rather than a narrative,
its theo-political ethic will reflect this perspective. As Weaver writes, "If Jesus is ofGod, as
Nicaea said, then it is Jesus' life that makes visible the contrast between the reign of God and the
social order in which he lived. "^^ The Nicaean formulation ofChristology, while effective and
necessary, is primarily propositional. Its use ofHellenistic philosophical language is descriptive
of an identity, yet thoroughly vague and generic. Weaver's appropriation ofYoder's analysis is
such that Christology must be understood as performative. It is for this reason that he grounds
his own Christological understanding in the Gospel narrative. The biblical text is equally
descriptive of Christ's being, but it does so within the context of a concrete historical person.
The Gospel narrative is existential and incamational and thus provides the reader with concrete
examples ofhow this particular man interacted with others. Thus, the Church is called to
embody something specific and unique, something not of the world.
If the Church is called to be an alternative to the powers in revolt, how specifically does
Yoder understand its structure, identity, and relationship to the world? That answer is, rather
ironically, complex in its simplicity: foundationally confessional and missiological. Ofprimary
importance for Yoder is the recovery of the Church's "distinctiveness (as) the visible
Ibid.
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embodiment ofGod's people in the world."^"* This "othemess" or "minority" status is in no way
an indication ofunique status or privilege in the eyes of God. Rather, it is inherently service
oriented. "The alternative community discharges a modeling mission. The church is called to be
now what the world is called to be ultimately (italics mine)."^^ Descriptions such as "people,"
"nation," or "kingdom" are not symbolic in nature. Rather, "they imply the calling to see oneself
as doing already on behalf of the wider world what the world is destined for in God's creative
purpose. The church is thus not chaplain or priest to the powers running the world: she is called
to be a microcosm of the wider society, not only as an idea, but also in her function.
"^^ The
Church is that community which has realized and submitted to the cosmic authority of Christ. Its
57distinctiveness "is a matter of awareness or knowledge or commitment or celebration." That
the Church is the "body of Christ" or the "people of God" is thus grounded in confession, which
must not be filtered or weakened in the name of social efficacy. This point is of paramount
importance for Yoder's ecclesiology.
Recall that a significant effect of the Constantinian shift is the dilution of the Church's
unique identity. Rather than base membership on a conscious and public profession of faith in
this unique historical narrative, the imperial co-optation of the Church reduces membership to
citizenship. Faith, the acknowledgement that Christ is Lord and thus normative for our own
political identity, is internalized and made non-descript. The result is a significantly truncated
theo-political ethic. Yoder therefore laments the "influx into the membership of the Christian
church of a larger number of persons for whom that new affiliation is not the expression of a
strong personal faith experience or commitment" because such a basis "means that there will be
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a need to adjust the expectations of ethical teachers with regard to how insightful and unselfish
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we can ask people to be." Ethical discernment becomes increasingly relative and subject to
imperial caprice. If such is the case, then a "Christian ethic" will be appropriated and
manipulated by a pagan ruler. Such a development, of which Constantine the person is guilty, is
in direct violation of the apostolic tradition. For Yoder, "the distinction between a state ethic and
a Christian ethic. . .(rests fundamentally) in the difference between belief and unbelief"^' The
remedy or counter to this development is a renewed proclamation of "the scandal of
particularity."^^ The missiological witness of the Church requires not the mitigation of its
identity in Christ, but rather a solidification of its particular faith. Thus he declares, "Only a
believing community with a 'thick' particular identity has something to say to whatever 'public'
is 'out there' to address."^' Nigel Goring Wright argues that, for Yoder, "Disavowing
particularism to include Christianity in the wider wisdom is a new form ofunbelief, both
sectarian and missionary, which avoids the risk of allegiance to the crucified Jesus, continuing
rather than correcting the Christendom. . .ultimately defending the dominant social and value
system. An incarnate ecclesiology must flagrantly risk the profession of a specific faith. It is
not the spiritual or religious segment of imperial ideology. Rather, it is the imitation of the
crucified Messiah. Ecclesiology cannot take any form other than of a sacrificial servant and it
does so in the face ofpublic hostility and persecution.
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Yoder is uniquely aware that the Church's role as dissident minority will incur violent
rejection. Indeed, its confession ofChrist's lordship requires such a reaction. For Yoder,
imitating Jesus' crucifixion is not primarily about the daily struggles of life or spiritual turmoil.
Rather, it is distinctively about the Church's social witness. He writes, "The believer's cross is
no longer any and every kind of suffering, sickness, or tension, the bearing ofwhich is
demanded. The believer's cross is, like that of Jesus, the price of social nonconformity. It is not,
like sickness or catastrophe, an inexplicable, unpredictable suffering; it is the end of a path fi-eely
chosen after counting the cost. . .it is the social reality of representing in an unwilling world the
Order to come."^^ Yoder is thus able to see in John 15:20 (servant is not greater than his master.
If they persecuted me they will persecute you) "a normative statement about the relation of our
social obedience to the messianity of Jesus. "^"^ Because its Lord experienced the hostility of the
old order, the Church should expect to experience it as well. It is indicative of the degree to
which the Constantinian shift corrupted the Church's identity that this natural hostility has tumed
into willful complacency. When the Church becomes "imperial chaplain" it becomes "unwilling
(and incapable). . .to bear the tension and rejection, on the part of the mass of the population or
the civil authorities, that would need to be faced by someone committed first of all to
restructuring the church according to the will ofGod." A faithful ecclesiology will not avoid
or weaken its confession in Christ. It will speak this identity into the void of imperial theology.
Doing so is not simply a form of evangelistic proclamation. More precisely, it is the essence of
discipleship. As Yoder declares, there is nothing more political than an altemative society
existing in contrast to the powers of death. The theo-political orientation of the Radical
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Reformation tradition is not witnessed in an effort to make the empire holy or pure, but in the
embodiment of its peculiar narrative. Historically, this model of church has been most
accurately embodied in the "believer's church." However, in order to understand the peculiar
form of "church" that Yoder advocates, it is helpful to understand the two altematives.
In contrast to the traditional typology ofAnabaptism, i.e. the "believer's church," Yoder
posits there developed two conflicting visions of "Constantinian ecclesiology." He labels the
first option "theocratic." This particular vision "hopes to reform society at large with one blow"
and subordinates the church's relationship with the state "to the common Christian takeover of
all society for the greater glory ofGod."^^ Historically, the theocratic pivot to the fiiture occurs
not with a minority community, but rather with "the whole of society."^'' Society is defined in
the broadest sense possible. Again we see the Constantinian effect on church membership. The
theocratic church is willfully absorbed into the body of the state, yielding its discipleship for the
purposes ofpower. As such, while the Christian community and its faith are preeminent, the
"secular" order is nevertheless viewed as a partner (and leader) in the movement ofhistory.
Indeed, civic authorities are still viewed as autonomous sources ofpower, whereby "the preacher
or prophet must not seek to govern the state or the economy -that would be to relapse into
clericalism - but it shall be govemed bymen who in their Christian calling do what God
demands as the preacher has interpreted it to them." Formal power remains in the hands of
"laymen/women," but it is nominal at best. Perhaps more insidiously, this particular vision
embodies the coercive form of "evangelism" or "conversion." Theocracy is foundationally
concemed with power and influence. Indeed, it concedes to the analysis that use of "power,"
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whether coercive or persuasive, is inevitable and "it will be best be exercised by the Christian."^'
Logically, one cannot seek to influence the whole of society, or direct the path ofhistory,
without obtaining some form of legal political power. Thus, the "theocratic Church" does not
seek to subvert imperial power, but rather take over. It aims to appropriate the members of the
empire into its own version of the state - a nominally Christian one. This model is a clear
repudiation ofGod character, for it replaces a loving creator who desires people to choose freely
of their allegiance to his reign, with an ominous dictator who demands obedience to the state at
the threat of death. It makes of the biblical God an image ofmortal tyranny. Here again is the
distortion of imperial theology. A doctrine ofpower and force is given the veneer of divine
blessing. Only this time the appeal is made to Christ.
The second vision is labeled the "spiritualist" model. Yoder describes this perspective as
"the reaction, in the footsteps of Schwenckfeld, that moves the locus ofmeaning from society to
the spirit."^� Interestingly, this vision is not fimdamentally different from the theocratic
altemative. Instead of seeking to exert significant influence over the formal political processes
of the state, the "spiritualist" focuses on the "spiritual inadequacy" of the social structures it finds
itself subject to.^' The emphatic focus on interior morality effectively forfeits a "practical
ethics" derived from the Gospel, to the prevailing morality of the secular order. Political power
is free to operate in a way that ignores the ethical demands of a radical Christology. Indeed, the
spiritualist vision is the ecclesiological compliment to the ethical assumption that "Jesus'
message was ahistorical by definition. . .that he dealt with spiritual and not social matters, with
the existential and not the concrete. What he proclaimed was not a social change but a new self-
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understanding, not obedience but atonement."^^ while it could be legitimately argued that the
"spiritualist church" does not adopt an extremely interiorized vision of the Gospel message,
spiritualism is certainly sympathetic to such a position. A spiritualized ecclesiology is primarily
concemed with "converting" or "saving" souls. It sees ethical discourse as secondary to
traditional evangelism. For the spiritualist, the church's role in society is to save the soul and
address the body if time permits. However, as both Yoder and Carter demonstrated, the Gospel
is inherently social. To assume that discipleship is limited to a personal morality or profession of
belief is a vohe-face away from the "kingdom ofGod." Christian faith is political whether we
recognize this point or not. To interiorize it is thus effectively to abandon it. The spiritualist
model, as understood by Yoder, is relativelymeaningless with regards to embodying the theo-
political ethic of the Gospel. It is a retreat into the recesses of the spirit and an essential
disavowal of the very spirit it claims to nurture.
For both the "theocratic" and "spiritualist" visions, the locus ofhistory and ethics remains
the wider society. A theocracy is designed to control the state while spiritualism concedes any
ethical discernment to the state. In contrast to these perspectives, Yoder posits the "believer's
church." This altemative is not a moderated position between theocracy and spiritualism but
rather, stands overagainst them. Along with the spiritualist model, the believer's church
"castigates the coldness and formalism of official theocratic churchdom." The theocratic
vision is ultimately a state bureaucracy claiming to be Christian. A confessional ecclesiology is
not an attempt to abandon any formal structure. Instead, it argues for an explicitly Scriptural
form of ecclesial witness, modeled on apostolic fellowship. Genuine Christian discipleship will
entail a visible altemative, both in structure (the gathered people) and practice (liturgical
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worship). Concurrently, the believer's church agrees with the theocratic vision in its rejection of
"the individualism and the elite self-consciousness of the spiritualist."^"* The development of a
distinct community cannot be interiorized for it is fundamentally a social movement, distinct
from the processes of the world. And yet, it will not countenance the sanctification of
Christendom. Rather, it seeks to embody an altemative society of "covenanted fellowship
enjoyed with others who have pledged themselves to following the same Lord."''^
Vital to the development of the "believer's church" is a recognition that membership
must be voluntary. Theocracy and spiritualism do not challenge the dominant consequence of
Constantiniansim: the disappearance of the visible, altemative community of confessional
disciples. The imperial conversion made it such that Christian identity became more about
citizenship and birth, rather than a conscious decision or profession of faith. If the Church is
understood not as body constituted by grace, but rather power and coercion, any sense of
pneumatological guidance is forgotten. The "theocratic" and "spiritualisf models seek not to
discem the movement ofGod's Spirit in history, but rather to control it, direct it, and itemize it
for personal use. The "believer's church" is "a radical altemative" to this position.''^ Yoder
writes, "Precisely because a community of faith is distinct from the wider society not only in
membership but also in decision-making structure and values, it can be the agent of responsible
moral discernment."^' Only a community of voluntary submission to God can be open to the
movement ofhis Spirit. The imperial church, concemed more with power and status, struggles
to hear the voice ofGod. This is not so because it actively denies the presence ofGod in the
world, but precisely because it seeks to appropriate and manipulate that Spirit for the purposes of
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the state. This perspective subordinates the missiological politics ofGod's chosen people to the
movement of civic authority. In doing so, the standard for ethical discernment becomes not what
is right or wrong, measured against the Gospel witness ofChrist, but what is good or possible or
most effective. For Yoder, theocratic and spiritualist ethics are indicative of this shift.
Moreover, it leads to an ecclesial self-righteousness. If the theocratic or spiritualist models only
aim to do what's possible, if they are restricted by the desire (right or wrong) to "do good" in and
through the world, then they are justified in thinking that "what they do" is righteous in and of
itself. Ethical decisions can have little to do with the Gospel because "righteousness" is viewed
in a personal context. If the person is a believer, whether theocrat or spiritualist, his/her
decisions can mirror secular society. Chrisfian ethics is therefore a misnomer for the Christian
"leader" bases his or her actions on efficiency and possibility. The "believer's church" in
contrast knows that "Christian ethics calls for behavior that is impossible except by miracles of
78the Holy Spirit." Christological incarnation is only possible through a pneumatological
transformation. Radical Reformation ecclesiology is concemed about both the substance and
form of one's community.
Yoder expands on this argument by addressing specific contrasts between the "believer's
church" and the other two visions. Moving from the abstract to the historically concrete, Yoder
uses the Puritan tradition as an illustration to theocracy and Pietism for spiritualism. In doing so,
he seeks to demonstrate their commonality. He writes, "With regard to the substance of ethics,
spiritualism and theocracy, i.e.. Pietism and Puritanism are more alike than different, for the
concentration on personal authenticity and on social control is not contradictory but
complementary. The person who is truly regenerated and who, therefore, is humble and
Ibid, 174.
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unselfish will certainly make the best statesman."^' Their emphasis might be on certain issues or
methods, but they concede to the same reality: the church and secular power structures are
engaged in an intractable partnership, ofwhich it is desirable for the establishment of a
"Christian society." Again, the focus is on the civic authority, the influence the Church can exert
on it, such that "what [the] raler. . .is to do is not derived from either the words or examples of
Jesus, but from what any honest and reasonable person in that same position would do. The
imperatives are defined by the situation (or, as an older system said it, 'the station'), in which the
responsible person find himself or herself and not the positive word of the covenant God."^� The
Puritan and Pietist models represent this view ofbiblical ethics. Yoder contends that the
"believer's church" is the altemative. It is the incarnation of a new society designed to stand
opposed to the world, not in subordination to it. He writes, "The need is not, as some current
populizers would suggest, for most Christians to get out of the church and into the world. They
have been in the world all the time. The trouble is that they have been of the world, too. The
need is for what they do in the world to be different because they are Christian; to be a reflection
not merely of their restored self-confidence nor their power to set the course of society but of the
8 1social novelty of the covenant of grace." The believer's church is substantively shaped by the
Gospel and is called out of the world, not because it is superior, but because it must be in
sacrificial service. And in order to fiilfill this mission it must remain loyal to its Lord. This
perspective has often been used as evidence of Yoder's sectarian tendencies; a charge leveled
against Stanley Hauerwas as well. We will address this point later. For the present however, it
is incumbent to point out that for Yoder, this ecclesiological model is not an example of
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sectarianism, in which the Church retreats into the social desert. Rather, the "believer's church"
is the agent ofmissiological ethics. That is, if a Christocentric theo-political identity is
developed and embodied by the Christian community, the "believer's church" model is closest to
the Gospel tradition. It is essential for "moral nonconformity. "^^ jt demonstrates the point that
only a body constituted by a confessional stance and chosen membership will be able to
"communicate to the world something of the reconciling, i.e., the community-creating, love of
83God." In short, only the "believer's church" can embody the Christological ethics presented in
the biblical narrative.
According to Yoder's analysis, the conversion of Constantine distorted this biblical
narrative. Furthermore, Yoder does not see this shift as a temporary episode in history. Rather,
it represents a permanent perversion of the Church's identity. He argues that there are four
distinguishable shifts in which the Constantininian disposition changed form, but not substance.
The first shift occurred during the Renaissance and Reformation. During this period "cultural
identity" and "historical meaning" shifted away from Christendom to the nation-state.
Consequently, "it becomes more important now that one is French, or Spanish, or Dutch, or
English, or Swiss, than that one is part of the unity ofChristendom."^"* With nationality as the
dominant form of personal identification "one can now have wars, even holy wars, against other
Christian nations. "^^ Catholic theologianWilliam Cavanaugh argues that this development has
affected our entire understanding of the "Wars ofReligion" and the emergence of the nation-
state.
^2 Ibid, 81.
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The traditional historical interpretation of the European "Wars ofReligion" has claimed
that the violence of the period was the consequence of religious differences. Doctrinal
differences between Catholics and Protestants were seen as creating a natural tension that
eventually erupted into bloody conflict. Cavanaugh argues that this is an inverted reading of
history. He writes, "The myth of early modem 'religious wars' from which the modem state has
saved us is historically untme. The rise of the modem secular state is a historically contingent
event that has produced more, not less, violence. It has done so not by secularizing politics, but
by supplanting the imagination of the body of Christ with a heretical theology of salvation
through the state."^^ This last statement is critical to understanding both Cavanaugh' s and
Yoder's interpretation of this period in history. Both theologians contend that a) the modem
state represents a distorted version ofChristian eschatology and soteriology and b) this evolution
has neutered the Church's theo-political imagination. A central part of this process has been the
development of an altemative, secular mythological narrative. Cavanaugh contends,
"Although. . .Genesis and [Rousseau's] The Social Contract seem to be quite different tasks, both
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are similarly engaged with foundational stories ofhuman cooperation and division." Concepts
such as the creation, fall, and redemption are appropriated from the biblical narrative and
manipulated into a modernist form. Consider the issue of freedom.
The basic philosophical assumption of the secular state is that "freedom" is best
understood as the freedom of one individual from the encroachment of another. Thus, freedom
is the right to "be ourselves" or "do as we wish" and is one of the primary objectives ofmodem
politics. However, the Christian tradition posits a completely different understanding of
freedom. Rather than see it as freedom from community, the Christian concept is freedom of
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obedience and participation. The freedom ofboth individuals and communities is such that they
are able to join together and take part in creation.^^ From a theological perspective, the Christian
narrative speaks of a participation in the divine Trinity. The Genesis account portrays God as
bringing humanity into the creative process. This is not a denial of God's transcendence,
sovereignty, or power as creator, but a radical picture of God desiring to be in creative
relationship with humanity. In contrast the modem state sees God as "an undifferentiated
[being] who commands the lesser discrete will of individual humans by sheer power."^' As God
is viewed as a supernatural tyrant or puppeteer and humanity as possessing no genuine free will,
"freedom" is seen as the progressive assertion of the individual's power to determine his/her own
life. The natural state ofhumanity is individualistic and community/society is a voluntary
association for the purposes ofprotecting one's property.'^ Cavanaugh writes, "From the natural
equality of humans therefore arise the war of all against all, from which the Leviathan - enacted
by social confract - saves us."'' The freedom of individuals results in a natural state of
competition, oftentimes leading to violence. The modem state is our salvation from this
situation. This is what Cavanaugh refers to as the altemative soteriology of secularism. We are
thereby conditioned to see the "Wars ofReligion" as a consequence of religious factions with
secularism being the only force for peace and unity in the world. Cavanaugh argues that the very
term "Wars ofReligion" is anachronistic, "for what was at issue in these wars was the very
creation of religion as a set ofprivately held beliefs without direct political relevance."'^ Thus,
the Constantinian temptation to dismiss the theo-political identity of the Church has been
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adapted to the new poHtical system of statehood and it is further cloistered behind the beauty of
stained glass cathedrals. However, while the secular state engaged in a concerted effort to distort
the biblical narrative, religious figures contributed to the process as well; in particular Martin
Luther.
Cavanaugh argues that Luther's conception of "two kingdoms" represented an initial
attempt to purge the church of the worldly influence of the emerging nation-state. He writes,
Luther's "intention was to prevent the identification of any politics with the will ofGod, and thus
extricate the Church from its entanglement in coercive power."'^ However this theological
maneuver had two negative consequences. One, it signaled a concession of the "political" realm
to the state. Because the state is seen as the only legitimate entity to employ coercive force,
"Luther contributed to the myth of the state as peacemaker which would be invoked to confine
the Church."'"* If the State wields the sword, and is thus in charge of "national security," then the
any appeal to pax Christi is relatively meaningless. Peace is achieved not through obedience to
the Christological ethic, but rather through conquest and war. The second consequence of
Luther's "two kingdom" doctrine was that it made the Church a simple "preacher of the Word."'^
In a move toward spiritualism, the Church's purpose becomes about proclaiming "justification
by faith," at the expense of ethical transformation. Luther was correct in aiming to "remove" or
"counter" the worldly corruption of the Church. However, his efforts had unintended
consequences, most specifically the relegation of "religion" to the private realm and "politics" to
the public. This argument demonstrates the evolutionary nature of Constantinianism. Recall that
when Christianity became the official imperial religion, it changed the composition of the
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Church. Membership was not based primarily, or even ancillary, on a public and intentional
confession of faith. Instead, Christianity became a consequence of citizenship. To be a Roman
citizen was to be a Christian and to be a Christian was not as important as being a "good" citizen.
The emergence of the nation-state represented a reformulation of this effect. Yoder labels this
development "neo-Constantinianism."'^
The second Constantinian shift occurred during the Enlightenment and subsequent
"Revolutions." The dominant characteristic of this period was an explicit institutional separation
between the church and state apparatus. Civic and personal autonomy was the cultural
shibboleth. As such, the period represented the systematic codification of Enlightenment
liberalism. Individualism, fi-eedom, reason - the explicit separation of the church was an attempt
to ensure that these values went unchallenged. However, Yoder argues that this separation is
purely nominal. He writes, "Once the separation of church and state is seen as theologically
desirable, a society where this separation is achieved is not a pagan society but a nation
structured according to the will ofGod. . .moral identification of church with nation remains
despite institutional separation."'^ Official language may deny the intimacy between church and
state, but in practice the Constantinian shift remains. Secular power over the church, and church
acquiescence to the state, is informal but significant. This development is most obvious in our
American context and will be addressed more specifically with the analysis of Stanley Hauerwas
and William Stringfellow.
Yoder describes the third shift as State opposition to Christianity both "as value system
and institution."'^ We see this shift in the virulent religious persecution that occurred during and
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following the French Revolution. For example, following expulsion of the French monarch in
1815, the National Convention took the place of the Legislative Assembly and "proclaimed the
Republic."'' Along with a bourgeoisie led movement away from an authoritarian political
system, the French Revolution presented a significant challenge to the Christian faith.
According to church historian Justo Gonzalez, "The new leaders of the Revolution were
convinced that they were the harbingers of a new era in which science and reason would
overcome all superstition and religion - which after all, were nothing but the result of human
ignorance."'�� In place of traditional Christianity, the French revolutionaries promoted their own
unique religion. As disciples of reason and critical thinking, they worshipped a generic deity of
rational thought and created the "Cult ofReason. "'�' There were violent consequences to this
development. While Christian worship was technically permitted, revolutionary leaders did not
hesitate to use violence against "any priest who refused to swear before the altar of Freedom."
Gonzalez argues that between two and five thousand priests and dozens of nuns and lay members
were killed. The experience of the Christian churches in France, both Protestant and Catholic,
paradoxically represented a return to the apostolic period. Here again the Church was actively
persecuted by the state. Priests, nuns, and lay people became enemies of the state, representative
of regressive thinking and adherence to a tyrannical orthodoxy. And yet, rather than see the
experience as an opportunity to extricate itself from the secular system, most Christians tried to
subordinate their faith in an effort to save their lives.
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Yoder argues that the justifications and defense offered by the Church were significantly
nationalistic. He writes, "Their objection to the disadvantages or even persecution they
suffer(ed) takes the form of claiming that their faith does not make them disloyal to the nation.
In international and ecumenical contacts their national loyalty is professed, and the view of
world affairs held in their homeland is shared.'''^"* The persecuted Church viewed its status not
as a consequence of their discipleship (which Yoder claims is inevitable), but as something to be
denied and explained away. The prophetic voice of the Church was once again lost in the
dissonant chaos of the state. Regarding this final shift, Yoder addresses the development of
"liberation theology." This perspective contends, "'What God is doing in the world,' or 'hope,'
or 'salvation' is spelled out as a better power system yet to come, with which Christians
proleptically should identify." Echoing the theocratic vision of a Church organized according
to Christian principles, "liberation theologians" seek to replace an "authoritarian" system with a
more "progressive" or "jusf system. While the intention is laudable, the methods by which they
seek to achieve it are nothing short ofprogressive Constantinianism. Christian eschatology is
viewed through the prism of a better or newer political system, not the embodiment ofGod's
reign through His Church.
This historical analysis of the "Constantinian shift" is important for two reasons. One, it
demonstrates that the events of the fourth century were not a temporary diversion fi-om the
Church's original mission. Constantine's impact on the Church cannot be understood in a
minimal light, for it affected the direction and character of the Church in indelible ways.
Whether in the makeup of the Church's membership or in the development of a philosophically
based Christology, the movement from a marginalized people to an imperial sycophant was
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disastrous. Secondly, we can see this shift in our own American context. Americans like to
claim that "our world is not Rome's world. . .(and) we are not a tyranny or oligarchy or
aristocratic empire." This is of course technically correct. As a liberal democracy, America is
distinguishable from the political systems ofboth ancient Rome and 15* century Christendom.
However, Warren Carter argues that to conclude from this perspective that America is not an
"imperial power" is inappropriate. It is an example ofboth the liberal delusion and pervasive
myopia ofConstantinianism. He writes, "To most folks living in the Roman world, the empire
and its structures were as natural and normal as our political institutions appear to be for us."'�'
Our immersion in the democratic republican tradition makes it difficult to provide an objective
criticism of the political system. For Carter, "The Gospel trains its readers across the centuries to
engage in the same evaluation of and insight into the mling powers that impact their lives and the
1 08lives of others in the world." Radical Reformation ecclesiology seeks to embody this
subversive criticism. William Stringfellow embraces this tradition and argues that America
represents a contemporarymanifestation of ancient Babylon; that it is indeed indicative of the
Constantinian temptation to dismiss the political witness of the biblical text.
America, Constantine, and the Modern Development of Imperial Theology
Stringfellow argues that the dominant form ofbiblical exegesis in modem America tends
to ignore the theo-political ethics of the scriptural text. All the more, American Christians read
the Bible through a nationalistic lens, rather than their own national context against the biblical
paradigm. This tradition is a form ofAmerican apostasy. He writes.
To interpret the Bible for the convenience ofAmerica, as apropos as that may
seem to be to any American, represents a radical violence to both the character and
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content of the bibhcal message. It fosters a fatal vanity that America is a divinely
favored nation and makes of it a credo of a civic religion that is directly threatened
by, and, hence, which is anxious and hostile toward the biblical Word. It
arrogantly misappropriates political images from the Bible and applies them to
America so that America is conceived of as Zion: as the righteous nation, as a
people of superior political morality, as a country and society chosen and
especially esteemed by God.'�'
America is thus a modem Constantinian Empire with an idolatrous historicization of its own
history and the biblical narrative. From the Puritan notion of America as a "beacon of light to
the world" to the current belief that America is the "best hope of the world," American destiny is
seen as guided by the hand ofGod and manifest destiny is a nationalistic eschatology. The
unlimited progress of the nation, as Cavanaugh indicates, is American soteriology. As such,
America embodies the "neo-neo Constantinian shift." There is a nominal separation between
"church" and "state" as entities and yet much ofAmerican political language appropriates
religious imagery. American nationalism becomes a contemporary form ofRoman imperial
theology. This distortion is both cultural and political. Consider President George W. Bush's
appropriation of Johannine Christological language.
During a speech commemorating the first anniversary of the September 1 1 attacks.
President Bush ended his address with following statement: "Ours is the cause ofhuman
dignity: freedom guided by conscience and guarded by peace. This ideal ofAmerica is the hope
ofall mankind. That hope drew millions to this harbor. That hope lights our way. And the light
shines in the darkness. And the darkness will not overcome it. May God bless America."' '�
Words like "hope" and "light" are not merely generic symbols. Rather, they represent a
'�' William Stringfellow, An Ethicfor Christians and Other Aliens in a Strange Land (Waco,
TX: Word, Inc., 1973), 14.
"� Stephen B. Chapman, "Imperial Exegesis: When Caesar Interprets Scripture" in Anxious
About Empire: Theological Essays on the New Global Realities, ed. Wes Avram (Grand Rapids,
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significant distortion of the Johannine Gospel. John's prologue reads, "In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God.
All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being. What
has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light ofall people. The light shines in
the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome �Y."'" In his speech, Bush distorted the
theological core of John's Gospel. Any similarities are superficial at best. While both passages
are highly symboHc in their appeal to "hope" and "lighf dispelling the darkness of the world.
Bush's comments are the antithesis of John's Gospel. Chapman writes, "What Bush offered in
his speech. . .was the cadence of the biblical passage, stripped from its actual context, as a means
of giving rhetorical resonance to traditional American values like human dignity, freedom,
conscience, peace and hope." This particular event does not represent an aberration m
contemporary political discourse. Rather, it is indicative of the American tendency to
appropriate biblical language for its own purposes. It is what Stringfellow described as an
"Americanization" ofbiblical politics and culture.
To speak ofbiblical culture as a "culture of life" is a precarious endeavor. Within our
contemporary context, the phrase often accompanies the protests and lamentations of the "right
to life" movement. However, just as there is an explicit theo-political message to the bible, there
is also a cultural identity as well. And as with the American distortion of scriptural politics, the
state has sought to manipulate or dismiss the biblical culture as well. Eugene McCarraher
1 13
describes this process as the replacement of the imago dei with the libido dominandi. America
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has subverted the bibhcal culture of life with its own "culture of death" - marked by "poverty,
unemployment, and alienation. . .abortion, capital punishment, and war."""* The Christian theo-
political stance is fundamentally "the affirmation of life." He argues that the Church must
embrace its tradition and deny the American Empire to continue its reign of death. This process
is diverse and comprehensive. For example, it includes explicit political activism - "don't
participate in wars; don't have an abortion; protest state-sponsored murder of offenders; create
an economy that provides useful, remunerative and cooperative employment.""^ And yet, as a
devout Catholic, McCarraher recognizes the vital need for the Church to embody its own
politics, most clearly expressed through liturgical practices. He argues for a retum to the
"fundamentals" - the sacraments, prayer, study of Scripture, and tradition."^ For McCarraher,
these liturgical practices are the core of the Church's distinct political activism. That is, they
provide the heuristic foundation for the Gospel culture of life.
Much of traditional theological scholarship has failed to recognize these arguments about
America's captivity to an imperial ethic and the Constantinian faith of the contemporary Church.
There is a failure to see the rhetorical distortion of the Gospel narrative as "blasphemous speech,
speech in which crypto-Christian language is used to confer messianic significance upon the
state. The legacy of Constantine has been bom anew in the American state. Furthermore, the
privatization of the Church begun during the emergence of the nation-state has precipitated this
development. The State is able to use biblical language in the public square because the Church
has forfeited its role as bearer ofGod's Word. There is no ecclesial dissent from this distortion.
Thus, "there is little resistance to the official Orwellian designation ofwar as peace. . .racial
"^Ibid.
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conflict has been suppressed by an elaborate apartheid; products which supposedly mean
abundance or convenience turn out to contaminate or jeopardize life; the environment itself is
rendered hostile; there is pervasive babel; privacy is a memory because surveillance is
ubiquitous; institutional coercion of human beings has proliferated endlessly.""' Americans in
general, and the Church in particular, have come to see "American culture" as normal. Thus, the
American way of life is supported by sacrifices made at the altars ofWal-Mart and McDonalds.
The American court system purports to base all testimonies on fidelity to God, yet serves as a
funnel system into a retributive prison industrial complex. Perhaps most tragic is that this
"culture of death" thrives under the banner of divine prerogative. Because America is seen as an
elect nation, its culture is seen as normative. Moreover, it has provided a divine justification for
as with Constantine, America is seen as the agent ofGod's redemption and justice and whichever
ethic happens to develop is seen as justifiable. Injustice is viewed as justice, immorality as
morality, and biblical distortions as fidelity to the text. In short, "the deadly atmosphere which
pervades America now as the essential tmth of existence for nations and other principalities is
estrangement and conflict with human beings - a condition which the Bible designates as the
Fall.""^ America is nominally Christian, while existentially Babylonian.
We see the appropriation ofboth Stringfellow's Gospel critique and Radical
Reformation's Christological ecclesiology in the work of Stanley Hauerwas. Hauerwas is
important, in part, because he explicitly appropriates this particular analysis to an American
context. This is certainly the result of his location within the American tradition. Australian
scholar Geoffery Brennan argues that the unique historical evolution and philosophical
foundation ofAmerica creates a "kind of civic morality that impels American self-
"' Chapman, Anxious About Empire, 20.
Ibid, 21.
41
consciousness.""' The consequence of this culture is that politics is essential to America's self-
identity. Its Presidents are expected to be heroes, its legislators genuine voices of the people.
This is not the case in other parliamentary democracies. For example the political system in
Australia is seen as a form of "business" or "work" as any other. It is mundane and something
akin to "dentistry or bricklaying."'^^ This is not the case in America. Because of his situation
within the distinctive character ofAmerican democracy, Hauerwas is uniquely suited to provide
a "Yoderian" examination of the system. He provides an analysis of the "American"
philosophical constructs of liberalism and democracy. In doing so, he offers an argument that
seeks to project onto the American democratic system the Gospel critique of empire. Indeed, he
provides significant support and evidence for the arguments of Stringfellow and McCarraher.
For Hauerwas, the essential framework ofAmerican democracy is Enlightenment
philosophical liberalism. Accordingly, this particular philosophical worldview makes it so that
America is the epitome of a modem nation-state. As such it is corrosive to the Christian witness
for two primary reasons. First, in traditional liberal fashion, it contends that "good societies are
characterized by freedom and equality of individuals, which [seek] as much cooperation as
possible between those individuals in spite of the fact that they share nothing in common other
than their commitment to abstractions 'freedom and equality'." Ethically then this system
entails a bifurcated understanding of "being" and "doing." He writes, "liberalism produces
characters who believe what they do is not who they are as well as moral theories, deontic and
utilitarian alike, that are designed to underwrite the lack of connection between our being and our
"' Geoffrey Brennan, "Stanley Hauerwas and the Critique of Secular Liberahsm: A Report on a
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doing." '^^ The concept of virtue is therefore subordinated to an abstract interiorization. Ethical
discernment is not about who we are as individuals and communities but simply about what we
do and the consequence is a political incoherence. For example, he argues that the
neoconservative wing of the political right does not recognize their inconsistent support for the
"free market" and "family values." He writes, they "celebrate the 'free market,' but they insist
that we must distinguish between the economic, political, and cultural realms since they do not
want the habits acquired in the market to invade other aspects of our lives."'^^ The
neoconservative therefore does not understand that an economic viewpoint which coheres itself
to the liberal understanding ofpolitics as the effort to "leave people to free pursue their own
happiness"
'^'^
cannot compliment a political or cultural framework that seeks to restrict that very
freedom. We see this point in the current debate over "wedge-issues" of abortion and gay
marriage.
Because of their conditioning by enlightenment liberalism, neoconservatives are able to
logically posit a political argument in which the freedom advocated for the economic system
should not be extended to the cultural sphere. As a result, they stmggle to provide a coherent
explanation as to how an economic theory that promotes the unencumbered pursuit ofprofit can
be reconciled with the concept of "family values" which, according to their own policies seeks to
restrict freedom and is fundamentally about the group and what is best for them. Economic
liberalism is therefore grounded in "individual rights" while cultural liberalism is centered
around a social unit, the family; defined as much by what it is not than by what it is. For
Hauerwas, this distinction displays the essential irrationality of the American liberal political
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order. It is, at its core, a philosophical system that views the primary unit of society as the "free
mdividual." And yet, a number of the "conservative" liberal policies stand overagainst this
worldview. Of greater concern to Hauerwas is that this perspective forces upon the Church a
willftil embrace of its presupposition. American Christianity becomes a nominally particular
form ofAmerican civil religion. Hauerwas quotes Harold Bloom:
The American Religion, which is so prevalent among us, masks itself as
Protestant Christianity yet has ceased to be Christian. It has kept the figure of
Jesus, a very solitary and personal American Jesus, who is also the resurrected
Jesus rather than the cmcified Jesus or the Jesus who ascended again to the
Father. . .the Christian God has [not] been retained by [America], though he is
invoked endlessly by our leaders. . .but this invoked force appears to be the
American destiny, the God of our national faith. '^^
This neo-gnostic faith in an abstract deity ofmanifest destiny is the theological underpinning of
American democracy. Again, Hauerwas' contention with this development is that it completely
dismantles the particular witness of the Church. Even more so, it supplants a specific theo-
political vision, oftentimes opposed to liberal democracy, with an absolute loyalty to the
democratic state. A democratic society is thus seen as the best hope for embodying or promoting
our Christian convictions. The Church is replaced by the State as the agent of God's will. With
this neutered ecclesiology, the Christian faith becomes another form rather "knowledge" rather
than praxis'2^ a movement from the public to the private.
John Thompson argues that one ofHauerwas' primary contention with "liberalism" is
that it "has muted the Christian community, which has been driven from the 'public' domain into
127that labeled 'private.'" For Hauerwas, the Church is existentially a public, social witness. In
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his essay "The Church as God's New Language," he argues that events at Babel represented an
effort to "secure unity through the creation of a single language"'^^ and that Pentecost, the birth
of the Church, represented the embodiment of God's language. When the people gathered at
Shinar and attempted to subvert their differences and particularities through "language," God's
dispersion represented a judgment upon human inclination "to live as if they need not
acknowledge that their existence depends" on God.'^^ He argues that the scattering at Babel was
a gift ofGod, an effort to force the people to recognize that their identity lies in their
creatureliness. They are creatures of God. However, humanity, as it so often does, failed to
learn from its errors. Instead, they saw one another as "the Other," a perpetual threat to one's
security and prosperity. Babel thus represents the emergence of "powers and principalities."
Humanity is fiirther separated from its creator and each other - there arises a "theology of
isolation." Hauerwas writes, "The killing begun in Cain was now magnified as humankind's
130
cooperative ability unleashed a destmctiveness that is as terrible as it is irrational." War is
symbolic of the enmity that pervades throughout creation. Pentecost represents the
Christological culmination of the Abrahamic dissent. The calling ofAbraham is, in part, God's
recognition that creation is no longer unified. This peculiar people become the agents of God's
activism in the world. And yet Israel continually abandons its mission, seeking instead to mirror
the kingdoms that surround it. Pentecost is God's new language - "a community whose memory
of its Savior creates the miracle ofbeing a people whose very differences contribute to their
unity."'^' Here, at this point in history, God creates an altemative community, united in their
Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living In
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obedience to the crucified Christ. This new society is sustained through its particular narrative
tradition. The story of Israel interpreted through and reformulated by the Cross holds them
together. It becomes their new identity. The Church therefore does not "just have an altemative,
[it is] the altemative." Critical to understanding Hauerwas' perspective is his contention that
the Church is the agent and subject of the narrative.
Constantine's conversion is a co-optation of the biblical narrative. Again, the empire
becomes the locus ofhistory. However, according to Hauerwas, the bibhcal narrative cannot be
understood properly apart from the Church. Theology, soteriology, Christology, eschatology -
every aspect of the Christian faith is connected to our ecclesiological understanding. Therefore,
he argues, "the church is the necessary context of enquiry for the testing of [its] narrative. . .it
is. . .an ontological necessity ifwe are to know rightly that our world is capable of narrative
construal. Without the church the world would have no history."'^^ The Church is cmcial if
Christians are to embody the theo-political ethic of the Gospel. Narrative shapes ecclesiology
and ecclesiology embodies the narrative. When the Church makes itself the conscience or
chaplain of the state, when it allows its narrative to be manipulated for imperial means, it
abandons it particular identity. However, when it remains faithfiil to its tradition, it "theological
witness cannot help. . .be anything less than a challenge to the conventional wisdom of the world.
For the church is involved in nothing less than offering an altemative to war by providing the
world with a history by our willingness as Christian to go making 'disciples of all nation'.
"'^'^
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Echoing Yoder, Hauerwas urges the Church to reassert its own particular history and
tradition in regards to ethical discourse. The Gospel narrative is unambiguous in its
Christological identity. Issues such as peace cannot be reduced to the achievement of a base
level of social harmony. Liberalism, according to Hauerwas, is primarily an effort to "secure
tranquility by the destmction ofparticulars."'^^ The Enlightenment project contains its own
overarching narrative, but it is paradoxically vague and generic. Society is understood not
primarily in terms of a community constituted by obedience to God, but rather as the coming
together of persons into a social contract. A successful society is therefore defined as a system
that protects and avoids restricting the freedom of the individual. As such, any tradition or
altemative "community" which violates this balance is viewed as a threat. Therefore, "liberalism
has a tradition of destroying the Other." '^^ The particular theo-political identity of the Church is
forced to adapt itself to liberal philosophy. The result is a theological liberalism that anemically
seeks to guide the direction ofhistory and society and a theo-political vision that equates
Christianity with Democracy. For Hauerwas the "Social Gospel" movement of the early 20
century is indicative of the inclination to see America as a "democratic theocracy."
Walter Rauschenbusch, a key individual in the Social Gospel movement, understood
social sin as it related to the stmcture of society, indicating that either an organization is "under
the law of Christ. . .or the law ofMammon."'" The Industrial Revolution had proffered itself to
the god ofwealth. Attracted to the comforts of this new system, the Church began to abandon its
task of prophetic ministry. Rather than embody the "prophetic stream of faith and hope" seen in
the Gospel narrative of Jesus, the Church had opted for "sacramentalist, clericalist
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ecclesiasticism."'^^ This assessment of early 20* century Christianity is prescient in that it
echoes some of the concems ofboth Yoder and Hauerwas. Rauschenbusch recognizes that the
Church, particularly in America, had failed to remember its own prophetic tradition. Conceding
the political realm to secular authorities, it had confined its own witness to a new form of
"spiritualist pastoral advocacy." However, instead of seeing this period as opportunity for
ecclesiological renewal, Rauschenbusch opts instead for a deeper entrenchment into the
Constantinian system. Thompson argues, "The contemporary church should emulate
Constantine and give a Chrisfian soul to socialism, drawing upon earlier ecclesial practice in
which the churches were 'not communities for the performance of common worship, so much as
communities with a common life. . .with a religious basis. . .they were democratic organizations
139of plain people." For Rauschenbush, the apostolic church was not grounded in the liturgical
practices ofbaptism or the Eucharist. The very core of the Church, its particular theo-political
identity was not understood in terms of confession or even faith, but rather as an ancient form of
political unions. Its mission was not the constitution of an altemative society transformed by the
Gospel of a cmcified criminal, but rather to build a new liberal society within the old. In the
vein ofConstantine, Rauschenbusch sought to subordinate any sense of ecclesial distinction to
the civic empire. Thompson writes, the "symphonic view of the relationship of church and state
displays the creative relationship Rauschenbusch believed potentially existed between the church
institutions and communities and American society at large."'''� Rauschenbusch argued for the
continued cooperation of the Church with the American state. As a result, "church people would
be better reducing their litiargical time together in favor of assisting in social progress through
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education and the power of its more influence."'^' Hauerwas sees this perspective as a complete
denial of the Church's particular theo-political identity.
These ecclesiological distortions are the product of the Social Gospel's theological and
histoncal framework. For Hauerwas, the Social Gospel is thoroughly captive to Enlightenment
philosophy. Instead of a Christian ethics based on discipleship and obedience, Rauschenbusch
argued for an ecclesiology primarily concemed with success. "Unless the church is engaged in
society, it is. . .a regressive institution."'^^ Church must contribute to the development of a
more progressive liberal society. Theological reflection is therefore only consequential if it
contributes to the political activism ofChristians. Considering the Social Gospels acceptance of
the liberal epistemology, we can understand this perspective. Rauschenbusch, as a number of
progressive Christians today, was conditioned by liberal political philosophy. He could not
fathom the Church as a distinctive theo-political worldview or tradition. Rather, ecclesiology is
simply the medium through which Christian theology is connected to the traditions ofmodem
America. As a result, it "becomes a second-order reflection, a matter of aesthetics rather than a
tmthful purchase on reality, offering nothing essential to the account provided by liberal
sociology."'''^ This acceptance of the modem agenda has therefore tmncated the Church's
distinctive theo-political witness.
The perspective espoused by Rauschenbusch is simultaneously theocratic and spiritualist
and displays an infidelity to the biblical narrative. Thompson writes, "what the Social Gospel
calls prophecy is not resourced by the biblical-ecclesial tradition represented in church but by the
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conclusions of an alien pattern of thought onto which this latter is grafted."'^^ For Hauerwas, the
Social Gospel is merely an attempt to alleviate the social sin ofAmerican society, and not a
movement of revival. The Church is a necessary redundancy, a positive institution, but
nevertheless inconsequential for ethical discernment. Secular society and civic institutions are
the agents for God's Kingdom. As a result, "the church's task is merely to provide good
socialists who will transform the world in terms of socialist ideology since there is no necessary
ecclesial contribution beyond giving religious legitimization to that ideology."'^^ This further
supports the inherent paradox of liberal political and theological philosophy. Rauschenbusch
understood the Church as the conscience of society, merely designed to produce "good, moral"
citizens. And yet, he saw sin as an inherently social constmct - "Christian freedom. . .involves
social redemption rather than simply an individual one."'''^ Rauschenbusch therefore laments the
individualistic spiritualism ofmuch ofChristian history, arguing for a social understanding of
theology, but does not see the Church as a distinct society itself The communal aspects of faith
are projected onto the secular state. The result is an ecclesiological ineptitude that merely accepts
the terms ofpolitical discourse rather than offer a fundamental challenge as an altemative polls -
America is the polls. Church is the conscience. And yet even so, this conscience is limited by
American pluralism.
In addition to Enlightenment liberalism, the American democratic political system is
founded on pluralism. One of the major voices for democratic pluralism fi"om within the
Christian community was Reinhold Niebuhr. Neibuhr is historically known for offering a
rigorous critique of the American democratic project. Following the catastrophe ofWorld War
Ibid, 75.
Ibid.
Ibid.
50
11, which occasioned a reevaluation ofHberal democracy, Neibuhr offered what he called a
"realistic defense of democracy."'^' Following in the tradition ofKarl Barth, Niebuhr saw
liberal political philosophy cmmble in the wake ofGerman Nationalism and the collapse of
cultural humanism. However, Niebuhr was unwilling to abandon completely democratic liberal
language. Sympathetic to the critiques of capitalism coming from various socialistic sources,
Niebuhr was equally unwilling to embrace the Soviet embodiment of this critique. The result
was an amalgam ofChristian socialism and democratic realism. And yet, in practice and theory,
the appeal to Christianity was nominal. Niebuhr's project was an effort to challenge and reverse
what he saw as the political irrelevancy ofmainstream Christianity.'"*^
Niebuhr contends that a realistic vindication of democracy cannot be found in the
particular revelation of God in Christ. Instead, he bases his argument in what Hauerwas
describes as a "theological anthropology."'"" In doing so, he seeks to go beyond the traditional
understanding of democracy as the result ofbourgeois revolution. He writes.
Bourgeois democracy frequently exalted the individual at the expense of the
community; but its emphasis upon liberty contained a valid element, which
transcended its excessive individualism. The community requires liberty as much
as does the individual; and the individual requires community more than
bourgeois thought comprehended. Democracy can therefore not be equated with
freedom. An ideal democratic order seeks unity within the conditions of freedom;
and maintains freedom with the framework of order.
'^�
Democracy is not primarily a system that guarantees or protects the uninhibited freedom of
individuals. Left unchecked, freedom can be as destmctive as totalitarianism. A democratic
society is therefore one that seeks to protect an inherent liberty while lamenting possible disaster.
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What IS needed within a democratic society is the right balance between freedom, both personal
and social, and unity through order. It is this latter point that bothers Hauerwas so much. He
wntes, "Niebuhr accordingly understands democracy primarily in procedural terms, since it
would be against the very genius of democracy to be identified with any particular goods or
institutions whose purpose it is to secure those goods."'^' Democracy becomes not the label for
a specific government, but an abstract concept with no tme application. It is defined by freedom,
order, unity, harmony, and liberty - amorphous terms which can be molded to meet the needs of
a powerfril majority. Democracy is little more than a proposition. The Christian faith, rooted in
a unique narrative tradition, cannot be the basis for any democratic society. The distinctiveness
of its history and worldview cannot be adapted to a pluralistic political system.
There are significant points of disconnect between a Chrisfian political perspective and
that of a liberal democratic bent, the most apparent being liberalism's assumption that individual
freedom is the ultimate ethical norm, indeed the "primary content of natural law."'^^
Enlightenment liberalism is based on the proposition that "freedom" to pursue one's own desires,
within certain limitations, is the greatest good. What figures like Niebuhr fail to acknowledge is
that this perspective is thoroughly conditioned by its own particular narrative. Rather than being
based on a universal philosophy, transcendent of historical particularities. Enlightenment
liberalism is a contingent worldview. Recall Cavanaugh' s discussion of the impact of the
political philosophies ofRousseau and Hobbes as counter-narratives to the scriptures. Their
work shaped the development ofwestem democracies as much as any Roman and Greek
traditions. Indeed, their contention that individuals are naturally autonomous and only through
competition enter into communities is the basis for how a democratic polls understands itself
Ibid.
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The Hberal philosophical tradition therefore is as conditional and specific as the Christian
narrative. For example, one of its central tenets is that a democratic system is fundamentally
competitive in nature. Whether between individuals or groups, political competition is a means
by which we achieve a balance ofpower between interest groups. Political discourse is now
centered on issues. "Politics" then is about compromise over a certain issue between two
interest groups. This particular scheme is seen in the issue of abortion.
Eugene McCarraher sees the conflict over abortion as misunderstood by most. It is not,
as Hauerwas believes as well, primarily about morality or even life. Rather, "abortion becomes
conceivable as a moral practice once we take individual autonomy as the beau ideal of the self;
but to recognize that is, ifwe're logical, to indict not only abortion but also our cherished idyll of
'choice' or 'freedom.' But that, then, is to indict capitalism, which employs a similar language
of sovereignty both to legitimate itself and to obscure the remarkable lack of creative freedom at
work."'^^ Thus, appeals to the "rights of a fetus" or the "freedom of the woman's body" are
important, but ultimately contingent upon the liberal framework. As a result, the activism of
each side is limited to the accumulation and distribution of power. As such, the current issue is
centered on the appointment of judges and judicial activism becomes the watchword ofpolitical
discernment. Decisions that people can make ultimately lead back to the advocacy for a
particular judicial temperament. Life is not the issue. Rather, discussions about abortion are
framed in terms of power and rights, the vocabulary of liberal enlightenment. This is how the
system works and it diminishes the Church's witness. Instead of advocating a comprehensive
"pro-life" ethic, in which the Church enters the void and seeks to provide the kind of support that
so many pregnant women lack, the Christian community concedes defeat. Instead of
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proclaiming the imago dei, the Church speaks in the tongues of Caesar. It may be legitimate for
Christians to see moral issues through a particular lens (their faith) but they must adapt such a
perspective to be effective in the system. Again, pluralism thus makes the Christian faith a form
of accessible knowledge and language, rather than embodied narrative. Hauerwas writes,
"Judaism and Catholicism, if they are to be 'profound' religions, must think of themselves as
expressions of a more determinative human condition - that is, as knowledge available to
anyone. Only in this way do they become acceptable religions within the democratic
marketplace."'^'' The implications for the Church are profound. Rather than seeing itself as the
bearer of divine revelation, as the incamate body of Christ in the world, the Church is simply
viewed as one "choice" among many. Of course this viewpoint in turn reinforces the notion that
liberalism is primarily about individual choice. In short, it imposes upon a theological
community the standards of liberal free-market capitalism. Ecclesiology is therefore not about
discipleship and confessing Christ as Lord, but rather the process by which a group of religious
participants seek to present themselves as the best choice. This process distorts Christology as
well.
Because faith is understood as a nebulous system of knowledge, shorn of its own
historicity, the incursive incamation of God breaking into the world is demythologized. Christ is
therefore seen not as the agent ofGod's kingdom, the locus ofhis reign, but rather as the moral
exemplar of a democratic theological anthropology. He provides the normative ethic of love,
but does not expect that his followers can embody it.'^^ Niebuhr' s Christological doctrine is thus
completely interiorized and privatized. He writes, "Jesus did not counsel his disciples to forgive
seventy time seven in order that they might convert their enemies or make them more favorably
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disposed. He counseled it as an effort to approximate complete moral perfection, the perfection
ofGod. . .He did not dwell upon the social consequences of these moral actions, because he
viewed them from an inner and a transcendent perspective."'^^ He goes on to describe the kind
of religious idealism that seeks to embody the ethic of Jesus as socially inefficacious. Ethics,
politics, the social realm, is all about relevance for Niebuhr. Ecclesiology is about the shaping of
the Church so that it provides the clearest support for liberal democracy. Christology is a sterile
form of the teachings of Jesus so that the lowest common denominator can be accepted by the
secular order. And ethics are about the Christian's ability to relevantly affect the shape and
direction of society. The theo-political worldview presented in the Gospels is fiindamentally
non-social. Indeed, the notion that there would be a "theological politics" is incomprehensible to
Neibuhr. Theology is inherently religious, and the religious sphere is intemal. Conversely,
politics is primarily a social constmct. Thus, he writes, "Political morality, in other words, is in
the most uncompromising antithesis to religious morality."'^' The two are mutually exclusive.
What is tmly disconcerting about Niebuhr's thesis is that he recognizes the limitations
and dangers of a liberal democracy. Its coercive and competitive nature, most often manifested
and controlled through violence, its injustices and immorality - Niebuhr offers an excellent
analysis ofAmerican democracy. He even offers some prescient critiques of the America
church, writing: "The insights of the Christian religion have become the almost exclusive
possession of the more comfortable and privileged classes. These have sentimentalized them to
such a degree, that the disinherited, who ought to avail themselves of their resources, have
become so conscious of the moral confusions which are associated with them, that the insights
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics
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are not immediately available for the social stmggle in the Westem world."'^^ He recognizes the
prophetic tradition of the biblical text and appears to lament the fact that the elite cormpted this
vision. He continues in this manner, writing, "It is probably not too severe a judgment to declare
that no group within a nation will ever criticize the nation as severely as the nation ought to be
criticized, if it does not stand partly outside of the nation."'^' These two statements should lead
to a radical form of ecclesial witness. Niebuhr recognizes that the Christian narrative is at its
core prophetic and that the modem nation-state requires an autonomous body to criticize it. This
is a core component of the Yoder/Hauerwas paradigm. Yet Niebuhr, due certainly to his own
immersion the Enlightenment project, could not imagine that the Church might embody this
particular critique.
Within American democratic society, the Church is not the bearer ofGod's Kingdom, the
political system is. As indicated above, this has not always been the case. The Social Gospel
saw the "kingdom ofGod" as a program to be implemented - "church and world alike stood
under the identical challenge to create a Christian social order through political democracy and
fraternal socialism. Rauschenbusch frilly embraced the Troeltschian idealization of "the
Kingdom." According to Emst Troeltsch, "the Kingdom fiinctions ideologically. . .as an infinite
task, the Kingdom will never arrive in history but is rather upheld as that which is to be
'progressed' towards via the gradual accumulation and reforms of the always-already givens of
history."^^^ The Social Gospel is captive to the modem historicist tendency to dismiss the
concrete, revolutionary action of God's incursion into history. Rather, the Kingdom is an ideal
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Ibid, 226.
Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival In A Liberal Society (Minneapolis,
MN: Winston Press, hic, 1985), 109.
Nathan Kerr, Christ, History, Apocalyptic: The Politics ofChristian Mission (Eugene, OR:
Cascade Books, 2009), 60.
56
that must adapt itself to the given stmctures of the period. Consequently the "kingdom of God"
IS equated with American democracy. Yet, as Hauerwas argues, "it is not our task to make the
world" the kingdom. . .it is our task to be a people who can witness to the world what it means to
be confident of the Lord of this worid that we wish for not more than our daily bread."'" Thus a
kingdom ethic is not about progress or effectiveness and it should not be adapted to meet some
Niebuhrian ideal of relevance. Rather it is primarily about the Church's discipleship to the
cosmic-historical inbreaking of God's new creation. What is needed therefore is liberation from
this systematic distortion. To be liberated is not about human freedom or cosmological
restoration, rather it is about the Church recovering "her distinctive identity and freedom [so]
that she can tmthfrilly display the freedom of the Gospel.'"" It is a final break from
Constantine. With regards to a democratic state this separation means recognition that Christian
participation in said democracy is not absolute, but rather contingent.
Part of the America mythology is the belief that it is not a nation, as much as a
philosophy. It is not so much a country, as it is an ideal. To a point, this is certainly accurate.
America was not created and is not organized on the basis of natural territorial or common
heritage. Rather, what unites its citizens is an appeal to "freedom" and "liberty" and "equality."
For Hauerwas, these are noble precepts, but far too abstract. As such, he argues that it is difficult
to define democracy. Even more so, to ask the question whether or not the Church should
support democracy is to concede the terms of debate. He describes it as the posture of the social
establishment. The question is fimdamentally Constantinian. In contrast, he would have the
Church reclaim its alien status. He states,
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I would like Christians to recapture the posture of the peasant. The peasant does
not seek to become the master, but rather she wants to know how to survive under
the power of the master. The peasant, of course, has certain advantages. . .the
peasant must understand the master better than the master can understand himself
or herself The problem with Christian justifications of democracy is not that
alleged democratic social orders may not have some advantages, but that the
Christian fascination with democracy as 'our' form of government has rendered
us defenseless when, for example, the state goes to war.'"
For Hauerwas, the Church should be fundamentally dispossessed. It is a people of one
"kingdom" living in another. They embody the "already/not yet" ofChristian eschatology. And
for Hauerwas, this identity cannot be compromised by an allegiance to the State. A democratic
nation is not our home, for it "represents a penultimate reality. . .which does not take its agenda
firom the peaceable kingdom ofChrist.'"" Echoing Yoder, Hauerwas believes that any attempt
by the State to assert itself as the bearer of God's will or history, is anathema. That modem
nation-state is not only existentially precluded fi-om such an identity, its practical limitations are
such that it can only know its proper functions if the "church is clearly distinct.'"" If the Church
forfeits its distinct identity by partnering with the State it will become tempted to see state
institutions as vehicles for its own mission agenda.'" The Church cannot be understood in
isolation from its scriptural connection to Christ and his Kingdom. For Hauerwas, the "kingdom
ofGod" is our ecclesiology. He writes, "The kingdom of God is the hope of the people whom
God has called out among all the nations. . .without the kingdom ideal, the church loses its
identity-forming love; without the church, the kingdom ideal loses its concrete character.'""
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The "kingdom ofGod" is the Church's Christological theo-political ethic. And yet, how should
the Church embody this identity?
It is interesting to note that both Yoder and Hauerwas argue for limited, relative
engagement with the nation-state. Both accept that government, in the abstract, is legitimate and
biblically justifiable. Furthermore, neither one advocates the violent overthrow of the
government. Their position does not entail, as some critics contend, that either one is arguing for
a sectarian withdrawal from the world. Hauerwas writes, "Contrary to usual
stereotypes. . .peacekeepers [the Church], rather than withdraw from politics, must be the most
political of animals. Peacekeeping requires the development of the processes and institutions
that make possible confrontation and resolution of differences so that violence can be avoided.
The problem with politics, at leastpolitics as is currently understood, is that... it so little believes
in truth. "^^^ Instead ofwithdrawing from the political realm altogether, instituting a revival of
ancient monasticism, Hauerwas is calling for a complete reformulation of what it means to "be
political." Within a liberal democracy, political activism is rooted in, but not limited to, the
traditional practices of voting, governing, and lobbying. A citizen can choose to engage in all
three or just one, but if he/she does not, then they are either apolitical (apathetic) or sectarian
(irrelevant). Hauerwas' ecclesiology is an attempt to break down this narrative. He does not
deny that "Christian politics" will appear odd to the secular eye. Indeed, if the Church is
following its missionary task then it cannot help but engender mockery and scom. What
Hauerwas and Yoder argue for is creative engagement with the powers and principalities. The
Church should therefore offer "imaginative altemative(s) to activities which include explicit
violence, [in addition] to encourag(ing) those forms ofpolity which limit the pretensions of the
Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, 96 (italics mine).
59
state and which avail the church of social space within which to live out its calling.""" This is
what Hauerwas and Yoder refer to when they speak of Radical Reformation ecclesiology as an
altemative politics. And yet, the rather abstract and historically contingent nature of this
tradition makes it so that it is difficult to see how the contemporary Church is to embody this
position. For example, is the Church to embrace a radical, localized form of democratic
engagement? Or should it offer a completely new argument in the form of political
identification?
The problem with this ambiguity is that the American Church remains a "part" of the
American political project. While it can lament, critique, and discredit "liberal philosophy," it
remains a part of that tradition. Consider that while Hauerwas bemoans the dominance of liberal
thought as normative for ethical decisions, his own scholarship is, in some ways, indicative of
liberalism's emphasis on freedom. He is able, in part, to engage in the criticism of America
because America seeks to protect that right. Of course, his use of this "system" is such that he
aims to demonstrate the limitations and nefarious nature of liberalism. The important point
though, is that Hauerwas himself demonstrates the need for the Church to engage the language of
American political culture. While the theo-political ethic of the Gospel is manifestly "non-
ideological," it is beneficial to the Church's witness to utilize the political terminology of the
culture. This is a dangerous endeavor because the terms are already established. We have
already seen the limitations and errors of the Church claiming to be "pro-life". Concurrentiy its
use of the "progressive" label can conjure up images of either, 1) middle-class white people
attempting to fix or clean up the political system or 2) a contemporarymovement against
"traditional" values and family. However, it is my contention that we cannot escape these
Thompson, The Ecclesiology of Stanley Hauerwas, 190.
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limitations. Any philosophical label will bring with it certain presuppositions and "baggage."
What the Church must do is subvert these stereotypes. In doing so, it might be able to better
articulate its message. With regards to the tradition of Radical Reformation ecclesiology the
clearest "political orientation" which encapsulates its position is some form of anarchism.
Indeed, anarchist language is not an aberration with regards to the biblical narrative, it is
properly understood as rooted in the Hebrew scriptures.
Radical Reformation Theo-Politics and the Language of Anarchism
Liberal assumptions about what constitutes "anarchism" are well known. Due in large
part to its own historical evolution, many people understand "anarchism" to imply both the
violent rejection of all authority and the subsequent chaos left in the wake of that revolution.
However, these assumptions belie their captivity to traditional models of thinking. This
argument does not seek to impose upon the scriptures a rigid ideological framework, but rather
argues that the radical ecclesiology of the Yoderian bent leans toward an anarchist orientation.
Anarchism expresses the necessary linguistic creativity that can be employed to communicate
Radical Reformation ecclesiology into the American context. If liberalism places borders about
how we can talk about politics and the Church's relationship to the state, anarchism offers a
mode to speak differently. It should not be understood as the theo-political ethic of the Church.
That is the reign of God. Rather it is a communicative tool for the Church's imaginative dissent.
Perhaps the strongest proponent of a "Christian Anarchist" position was French
sociologist Jacques Ellul. Throughout his career, Ellul sought to articulate what he saw as the
obvious biblical orientation towards radical anarchism. In the process he confronted the
prejudices of anarchists towards Christians and visa versa. Ellul argues that, contrary to
traditional interpretations from both sides, there is a great deal of commonality that exists
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between "anarchism" and "biblical Christian." Ellul indicates that ofprimary importance to this
harmony between them is "an absolute rejection of violence.""' He is not unaware of the image
that a great number of anarchists have presented to the wider world. For example, he argues the
actions of both Russian nihilists and modem terrorists are indicative of the kind of anarchism
that stands opposed to the Gospel narrative. For Ellul, these particular movements do not
represent the pure form of anarchism. This type of anarchism seeks to use violence to bring
down a "system" in order to replace it with another authoritarian system paradoxically grounded
in disorder. More importantly "this line of thinking greatly underestimates the ability of
powerful organisms, as well as society, to resist and react.""^ A strong, centralized
organization will adapt to virulent criticism while simultaneously subverting any attempt at
reform or revolution. If the violent anarchist desires substantial change in the stmcture of
society, then they must abandon their adherence to such violence. Tmly revolutionary dissent
against the violence of the nation-state cannot be inherently violent itself The State is unequaled
in its physical capacity to exert power and is able to absorb and retum the violence of the
anarchists' twofold. Consider the reaction of the United States against the "anarchist laborers"
of the early 20* century. During the industrial labor strikes, the American government not only
violently quashed demonstrations and picket lines, but also did not hesitate to use the death
penalty in its punishment ofperceived radicals. Violent action is, among other things, a tactical
error. "We have begun to see that movements of nonviolence, when they are well managed. . .are
much more effective than violent movements. We not only recall the success ofGandhi, but
nearer home it is also evident that Martin Luther King did much to advance the cause of
American Blacks whereas later movements, for example, the Black Muslims and Black Panthers,
Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, 1 1 .
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which wanted to make quicker headway by using all kinds of violence, not only gained nothing
but even lost some of the gains made by King.""' Ellul therefore begins his argument with an
appeal to the practical nature of nonviolence. However, his attention to those tactical arguments
is secondary at best.
Ofprimary importance for Ellul is the recognition that, from a Christian perspective,
violent anarchism is a violation of the biblical admonition for love. Violence is fimdamentally
nihilistic and its denial of God is a demonstration of its ignorance and limitations. Conversely,
biblical anarchism is rooted in a dynamic affirmation ofGod's movement in the world. This
understanding challenges not only the methods used by anarchists, but also one of their core
values: the refusal of all masters. He writes, "Anarchists, wanting no political, economic, or
intellectual master, also want no religious master, no God, ofwhom the masters of this world as
we have seen, have made abundant use.'"^* Against this position, Ellul argues that the anarchist
objection is based on a distorted image of God. Rather than claiming that the anarchist vision of
religious authority is incorrect, he argues that the Christian communitymust present a more
biblical image of God. It must reformulate how it understands and communicates the traditional
understanding of God as "lord" or "king." There must be a balance between the literal
interpretation of an-arche as "no domination""^ and the bibhcal vision of God's sovereignty.
Ellul does not disregard or disagree with this imagery; rather, he argues "though the Biblical God
is the Almighty, in practice he does not make use of his omnipotence in his dealings with us
except in particular instances which are recorded precisely because they are abnormal (e.g., the
Flood, the Tower ofBabel, or Sodom and Gomorrah). God's is a self-limited omnipotence, not
Ibid.
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through caprice or fancy, but because anything else would be in contradiction with his very
being. For beyond power, the dominant and conditioningfact is that the being ofGod is
/ove.""^ From the Hebrew Scriptures to the Gospel narrative ofChrist, the scriptural text speaks
ofGod's ontological being in terms of love. It is because of his love that God has placed himself
in the confines ofhuman life in the incamation of Christ. "In the Bible there is a God who is
with us, who accompanies us in our ventures. This God can at times intervene but not according
to set laws or dictatorial caprice. . .the God whom the Bible portrays. . .makes decisions that might
seem to be arbitrary. He is a free God.""' For Ellul, authoritative images of God have been
manipulated by political powers, such that God is understood as a mechanistic being.
Integral to the anarchist understanding of "God as love" is the image of God as liberator.
Because God is free and unconditional and loves his creation freely, he desires that his creatures
be free as well. As such, "The biblical image of God is above all one who liberates us from all
bondage, from the anguish of living and the anguish of dying. Each time that he intervenes it is
to give us again the air of freedom. The cost is high. And it is through human beings that God
discharges this mission, mostly human beings who at first are frightened and refuse, as we see
from the many examples of God's pedagogy.""^ IfGod is therefore fimdamentally understood
in terms of love, freedom, and liberation, then sin is essentially that force which oppresses and
separates. For Ellul, this sin is embodied in fragmentation inherent to the nation-state, bom of
human rebellion.
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Ellul posits that "evil" is not the consequence ofmetaphysical beings operating in the
world. Rather, "we ourselves. . .are the issue, and we alone.""' Because we are given a free will
either to respond to or reject the love ofGod, we can also abuse this freedom. For Ellul, the
oppressive stmctures and institutions of the modem nation-state are manifestations of sin as
separation. Rather than serving as a means ofunity or cooperation, the state is oftentimes a
source of division and violence; not simply in its militarization of relationships, but also in the
capitalistic economic system which breeds atavistic competition. As with Yoder and Cavanaugh,
Ellul sees the imperial theology ofAmerican political power as a blatant cormption of the
Christian narrative. The theo-political vision of the Bible provides us with not only a completely
different picture ofGod, but also of community. The biblical concept of the "reign ofGod" is the
basis for genuine community and it is, for Ellul, bent towards anarchism. In addition to the
narrative ofMatthew's gospel, this perspective is grounded in the liberated community of the
Exodus.
According to Ellul, the society organized following the exodus out of Egypt was a tribal
system, in which "popular assemblies" were convened to make decisions."" It was
fundamentally opposed to centralized domination. Old Testament scholar Walter Bmeggemann
echoes this point. He writes, "The radical break ofMoses and Israel from imperial reality is a
two-dimensional break from both the religion of static triumphalism and the politics of
oppression and exploitation. . .the mythic claims of the empire are ended by the disclosure of the
alternative religion of the freedom ofGod. . .the reality emerging out of the Exodus is not just a
new religion or a new religious idea or a vision of freedom but the emergence ofa new social
community in history, a community that has historical body, that had to devise laws, patterns of
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governance and order, norms ofright and wrong, and sanctions ofaccountability. "^^^ The
Exodus IS not simply liberation from imperial theology, but the birth of an altemative theology,
grounded in a radically egalitarian vision of God and community. At the heart of this vision is
the proclamation ofGod's sovereignty over the cosmos. "The God of Israel had declared that he
and he alone would be Israel's head.'"'' As with Christ's ministry, Moses challenges the
assumption that the Egyptian pharaoh is in control ofhistory and creation. This altemative
community established at the Exodus is thus a cosmic "no" to the claims of empire. Instead, it
represents a society fimdamentally rooted in a theology. This community is not primarily
understood as a human constmct. It is not, as Hobbes and Locke, contend, a collection of
natiirally autonomous individuals seeking protection of their liberty. The foundational locus for
the Exodus community is neither competition nor a freedom to pursue prosperity. Rather, it is
their identity as God's "chosen people." They are a society or polls only because God has called
them to be one. And yet, as both Ellul and Bmeggemann indicate, this community was a
temporary event, for the Hebrew people rebelled from God and sought a "kingdom" of their
own.
The rise of the Israelite monarchy can legitimately be viewed as the first acquiescence to
the Constantinian temptation. Beginning with David, but reaching its apex in the reign of
Solomon, the emergence of a systematic kingdom signaled the end of the Exodus community
and the desire to be like the other nations. Ellul writes.
The assembled people. . .had now had enough of this political system. They
wanted a king so as to be like other nations. They also thought that a king would
be a better military leader. . .The God of Israel replied. . .The people have not
rejected you Samuel, but me, God. They have constantiy rejected me since I
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liberated them. Accept their demand but wam them ofwhat will happen. Hence
Samuel returned to the assembly of the people of Israel and told them that since
they wanted a king, they should have one. But they had to know what this king
would do. He would take their sons and make soldiers of them. He would take
their daughters for his harem or as domestic servants. He would impose taxes and
confiscate the best land.'"
Bmeggemann describes this shift as the "paganization of Israel.""" In opposition to the
egalitarian, cooperative commonwealth of Sinai, Solomon instituted a state-sponsored
syncretism. The Mosaic altemative had become an unacceptable vision. If the Hebrew people
were to have a successftil "kingdom" this peculiar vision would need to be drastically
restructured. The Solomonic shift indicated a movement away from the sovereignty of God.
Tmst in God was displaced by an effort to secure their prosperity and security. Bmeggemann
points to three particular distortions: the concentration of affluence guaranteed through
oppressive socialpolicies and justified by a static religion.
Bmeggemann argues, "the counterculture ofMoses lived in a world of scarcity" in which
their survival was dependent on Yahweh."^ However, during Solomon's reign, tmst in God was
replaced with a complacent satiation. This abundance ofwealth was secured through an
oppressive tax system and forced labor (a Hebrew version of the Egyptian empire). Every
stmcture and institution was ordered so that it fed into the state bureaucracy, which benefited an
elite few. Bmeggemann writes, "The order of the state was the overriding agenda and questions
of justice and freedom, the main program ofMoses, were necessarily and systematically
subordinated. Justice and freedom are inherently promissory; but this regime could not tolerate
promises, for they question the present oppressive ordering and threaten the very foundations of
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current self-serving.""' As with the Constantinian shift into the modem nation-state, this
development was devastating to the theo-political identity of the Hebrew people, histead of
seemg God as the ground of freedom, the Solomonic reign sought to "control" access to
Yahweh. The temple system therefore represented an established means by which those in
control were given access to God. "Now God is totally and unquestionably accessible to the
king and those to whom the king grants access. . .God is now 'on call,' and access to him is
controlled by the royal court. . .there will be no disturbing cry against the king here.""' Royal
theology subordinated the "freedom" ofGod, the inherent inaccessibility and fluidity, for that of
a mechanical deity which could be controlled and manipulated. The transcendence ofGod is
refracted into the temple stmctures and God does not come to us, but rather we go to God. As
with the Roman imperial system, theology is conceptually about proving divine support for the
actions of the monarch. Sovereignty describes the earthly king, and power is concentrated in the
hands of one man. The Solomonic empire did not worship the Yahweh of the Exodus, but rather
a God who was comfortable and safe. However, the pretensions of the empire did not go
unchallenged. Voices came from wilderness calling the people back to the God who "brought
them out Egypt."
Ellul describes the prophetic books of the Hebrew canon as a "politically odd
phenomenon. "For every king there was a prophet""' and the prophetic voice was essentially a
divine judgment on royal power. The prophets served as a "counterforce" that "did not represent
the people [but rather] represented God.""' In their dissent from royal oppression the prophets
signaled that Yahweh was the only sovereign and that any community that claimed to represent
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him must be shaped by a sacrificial and egalitarian love. "The prophets stated unceasingly that
the kings were mistaken, that the policies they were pursuing would have such and such
consequences which had to be viewed as a divine judgment.""" The Prophetic voice in the Old
Testament was essentially the call to revival, the urging of the people to retum to their roots, to
once more come together in an altemative community transformed by the love of Yahweh.
In a final criticism of the "royal theology" of the Hebrew monarchy, Ellul argues that the
book ofEcclesiastes is a dynamic rebuke of oppressive power. From its beginning it describes
the pursuit ofpolitical power, ofwhich the Hebrew kings engaged as "vanity and a pursuit of
wind.""' This criticism goes to the core ofpolitical power. From the biblical standpoint,
concentrated power is to be avoided not because it conceptually sinful, but because the human
beings cannot properly handle it. It is used not for justice, but for oppression, not for love but for
fear. Thus, Solomon gained obscene amounts ofwealth, built palaces that made the mountains
tremble, and sought to institute an age of culture and creativity at the expense of obedience to
God. And yet, his efforts were inconsequential. The kind ofpower pursued by the Solomons
and Caesars and Constantine is ultimately meaningless. Each of these figures represents the
human inclination to control not only their fellow creatures, but God as well. The consequence
of their actions is an imperial theology which aims to co-opt God's sovereignty. It purports that
we are in control of our own destiny, that history mns through the monarch or emperor or
president. Further, it is the denial ofGod's own creative activity in calling of a peculiar people.
In opposition to this system, Ellul argues for a biblical anarchism of obedience and
acknowledgement ofChrist's lordship.
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Anarchy is not the denial of God's authority nor does it represent an ideological
manifestation ofGod's reign. Rather, it is a linguistic and political orientation by which we can
communicate the sovereignty ofGod into our contemporary culture. It is an attempt to use the
language ofmodem liberalism to signal to an American power that its political system is not the
agent of the biblical narrative. Anarchism is usefol only as it helps communicate the radical
ecclesiology of the Yoderian tradition in a context shaped by the liberal enlightenment. It is not
an apostate theology or denial of orthodox belief, but rather an attempt to linguistically subvert
the parasite that is imperial theology. As such, it is both difficuh and necessary to provide
concrete examples of this perspective in action. Given that the radical ecclesiology of Yoder and
its political expression through anarchism are essentially abstract concepts, it is difficult to
discem how they can be embodied. However, there are historical examples of this discipleship;
communities which "act. . .because God has loved us, because we have been saved, because
God's Spirit dwells in us, because we have received revelation.'""
The clearest example of Christian anarchism comes not from the Radical Reformation
tradition, but rather ironically, out of orthodox Catholicism. When Dorothy Day and Peter
Maurin organized the first Catholic Worker houses in 1933, they were influenced by two specific
traditions. The first was radical Catholic social teaching. Both individuals disputed the religious
assumption that anarchism was incompatible with orthodox faith. Catholic principles like the
"dignity of the individual, the concept of a common good, the right ofworkers, and the principle
of subsidiarity and primacy of conscience" served as foundational components of their political
Jacques Ellul, The Politics ofGod and the Politics ofMan (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
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identity. More importantly, they were points of connection between orthodox faith and
traditional anarchism.'"
Day and Maurin saw these concepts as "parallels between Cathohc social teaching and a
society functioning according to the decentralized principles ofmutual aid and cooperation.""*
Fred Boeher contends that the concepts of "subsidiarity" and "primary of conscience" are
essential to understanding the Catholic Worker's anarchist influences. Subsidiarity purports that
"the government should never do what small bodies can accomplish."'" Within current political
ideology, this perspective appears to align itself not with anarchism, but rather libertarianism.
Indeed, some commentators have sought to distort Day's vision by appealing to this assumed
commonality. However, such an understanding is a gross misinterpretation. When Day and
Maurin spoke of subsidiarity, they were not referring to the systematic sanctification of the
individual that libertarians subscribe to. Libertarianism is not an anti-liberal philosophical
perspective. Rather, it is the political materialization ofEnlightenment liberalism. The rationale
behind this tradition seeks to elevate not only the individual, but also the individual as essentially
consumer and entrepreneur, to primary status. Russell Kirk writes,
" The minous failing of the
ideologues who call themselves libertarians is their fanatic attachment to a simple solitary
principle - that is, to the notion of personal fi-eedom as the whole end of the civil social order,
and indeed of human existence. The libertarians are oldfangled folk, in the sense that they live
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by certain abstractions of the nineteenth century.""' hi contrast, Day and Maurin saw
subsidiarity as essentially communal. Day writes, "We were taught in the Gospel to work from
the bottom up, not from the top down. Everything was personalist, we were our brother's
keeper, and we were not to pass by our neighbor who has fallen by the wayside and let the State,
the all encroaching State, take over, but were to do all we could ourselves.'"" For Maurin and
Day, the modem nation-state, marked by nihilistic individualism and rationalistic mythology, is
the concrete manifestation of a breakdown in genuine community. It represents our own "royal
consciousness" in which the complacency and gluttony of own lives result in an overwhelming
disregard for our neighbor. To the Catholic Workers, this development was not only a secular
idolatry; it represented the captivity of our conscience.
A critical, if overlooked, aspect of the Constantinian shift is its captivity of the Church's
political imagination. It incarcerates the Church's vision such that it cannot envision itself as
anything other than a partner in the political system. Radical Reformation ecclesiology, in
contrast, is insistent on political creativity. Drawing on ancient sources of tradition, it claims to
imagine an altemative theo-political vision. For Yoder et al. the Constantinian shift does not
simply entail a stmctural change. Rather, it is essentially about a new way of thinking. The
Church's collusion with the state effectively prevents it from seeing the world through a biblical
lens. As such, the conscience ofboth the individual and community become captive to the state.
Day and Maurin sought to take back the conscience of the Christian. They quote Aquinas: "The
obligation of conscience has the force of a divine precept. . .therefore, since a divine precept is
binding when it is contrary to the precept of the prelate, and has a greater binding force than such
Russell Kirk, comment on "Libertarians: The Chirping Secretaries," Theopolitical Blog,
comment posted on October 27, 2008, http://www.theopolitical.com/?p=600
'9'^ Thorn, Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement: Centenary Essays, 98.
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a precept, the bond of conscience is superior to the bond arising from the precept of a prelate,
and conscience will bind in spite of the existence of the prelate's precept to the contrary.""' The
Catholic Worker embodied an altemative conscience to that of the state. Whereas the State
could and would in good conscience use coercive measure to assure its prosperity and security,
the Catholic Worker argued that the only basis for community was love and service. They dared
to imagine an altemative polls, a new way of being in community. Without explicitly drawing
on the Radical Reformation tradition, they represented an attempt to embody is ecclesiocentric
polls. A society grounded in the people of God serving the world. As such, their anarchism was
the political denial of the nation-state.
Boeher contends that "anarchism" is embedded in the Catholic Worker movement in
three primary ways. First, it represents a refusal to accept the State's definitions of social life.
As we have seen with Cavanaugh' s analysis of the rise of the nation-state and Hauerwas critique
ofNeibuhr, modem governments tend to organize themselves on the basis fear and security.
Enlightenment philosophy understood "community" not as the natural state of creation, but
rather as the necessary check on an individual's natural greed and competitiveness. Humanity,
for Hobbes and Rousseau, primarily consists of autonomous individuals freely pursuing their
own desires. Social bodies are created in order to protect the possessions and pursuits of the
individuals. From it inception, the modem nation-state has been viewed in a negative light. It is
necessary, but undesirable. The practical consequences of this perspective are such that
interactions and/or relationships are based not in mutual affection or common cause, but
competition. Policies become the means by which control is exerted over the masses. And
Ibid, 99.
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power becomes the inevitable weapon of the elite against "the Other." The State therefore seeks
to unify its citizens through fragmented unity.
Day and Maurin sought to deny this order. 'The Gospel example of helping one's sister,
brother, neighbor or enemy, is grounded in taking personal responsibility for the 'other.' The
bureaucratizing and systematizing of 'helping' and the creation of professions to assist others
leads to stripping away the precious dignity left for so many who are considered 'least' in
society. Stated bluntly, the Catholic Worker perspective is that the government is unable to
legislate compassion or dignity.""' In its place. Day and Maurin advocated "personalist
communities." The soup kitchens, homeless shelters, communal farms, and hospitality houses
represented a tangible embodiment ofYoder's radical ecclesiology, a church based form of
social activism. These altemative communities embodied what Ellul saw as the critical need of
Christians to "seek out the genuine poor"'�� and Day's emphasis on the dignity of the person.
John Cogely argues that the Catholic Worker was the
ideal of hospitality: being brother to brother, children of the same Father. Not
scientific social work - hospitality. Not haughty superior dealing with 'problem
cases' - hospitality. Not condescending judge dealing with errant accused -
hospitality. No, hospitality is derived from the Latin word for guest. It expresses
a relationship between equal men: host and guest. It is bound by the mles of
courtesy and human companionship, and mled by the law of charity. There are
always men and women who need hospitality for one reason or another. There
are, in an imperfect world of imperfect men and women, always those who need a
calling back to life, a restoration ofpersonality. There are always those lonely
people, in all times, in all places who need the knowledge ofbeing respected as
men and women, of living with other mean and women with dignity, of sharing
their own burdens with others and bearing. . .the burdens of others.'"'
199
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Jay M. Van Hook, "The Politics ofMan, the Politics ofGod, and the Politics of Freedom" in
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2�' John Cogley, "House ofHospitality," in A Penny a Copy: Readings from the Catholic
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To the Cathohc Worker, the nation-state is intrinsically a forced commodification of
community. People are segregated into isolated sections of society and there is no sense
ofGod's intended unity. The modem state is thus impersonal and inherently a
fragmented form of community. It is what Ellul called the diabolic nature ofpolitical
power. The anarchist identity of the Catholic Worker is therefore a protest against this
political dominion. It is the affirmation of individual personality and intimate
relationships. To the Christian Anarchist, the modem nation-state is thus grounded in
what it sees as the natural suspicion of individuals. There is no genuine sense of common
cause or cooperation, only competition and paranoia. We see in the Catholic Worker
movement not only the "philosophical" or "theological" commonalities between
anarchism and orthodox Christianity, but also the tangible embodiment ofwhat Radical
Reformation ecclesiology might look like.
There are two other examples of this kind ofmovement that help to envision what
an ecclesiological dissent from the nation-state would entail. In his book Torture and
Eucharist, William Cavanaugh argues for what he calls a "Eucharistic theo-political
identity" of the Church. This particular work is focused on the Pinochet regime in 1970s
Chile, particularly its use of torture as a means of intimidating and thereby controlling the
Chilean populace. Any attempt at dissent or criticism of the regime was met with violent
repression. Moreover, in the midst of this chaos the Catholic Church had abandoned its
role as a prophetic voice of life. It had, in short, fully embraced the Constantinian
arrangement (refracted through modem liberalism) of the Church as socially irrelevant.
Cavanaugh' s argument is therefore an attempt, as with Yoder and Hauerwas, to reassert
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'eace was
the Church's role as a distinctive polls. Within the Chilean context, this
manifested itself in two ways. One, The Committee ofCooperation for
organized to provide legal aid to "victims of repression. . .laborers who had lost their
jobs. . .and university students and professors expelled for political reasons. More
importantly COPACHI established an entire network of parish-based social programs to
counter the regime's political and economic strategy of individualization.'""
Furthermore, in the tradition of the Catholic Worker movement, COPACHI also
organized soup kitchens, youth clubs, cottage industries, and small groups by which poor
laborers could pool their resources. COPACHI represented a Church led movement of
social service against the centralization of the Chilean state. It was an effort, on behalf of
the Christian community, to embody what it saw as a genuine community. It was, in a
fundamental sense, the ecclesiological polls that Yoder argued for.
The second example from Cavanaugh' s work developed in the aftermath of the
forced closing ofCOPACHI. The Pinochet regime had declared "social organizations at
the base of society were illegal in the early years of the regime.'"" The State had, in
general Constantinian fashion, promoted itself as the savior of the people and as such
would not accept any challenge to that claim. Indeed, the only means by which a
Christian collective could attack the system was under the protection of the church. As
such. Cardinal Silva, following the closing ofCOPACHI, restmctured the movement into
the official Catholic Church hierarchy. The group thereby became a Vicariate of the
Catholic Church and organized local offices in every diocese throughout Chile.
Cavanaugh writes that the Vicaria was organized to provide three essential services:
William Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Pubhshing, 1998), 264.
Ibid, 265.
76
legal, informational, and social. Continuing COPACHI's efforts to challenge the legality
of the regime's blatant dismantling of habeas corpus, lawyers throughout the various
dioceses gathered valuable information about the regime's abuses. The Vicaria put this
information to use in its biweekly publication, Solidaridad, the "only source of ahemative
information in a media landscape entirely dominated by regime fonctionaries and
supporters." �' Finally, the Vicaria offered vital social services which were denied by the
Pinochet government. Health clinics, parish soup kitchens, garden projects, cooperative
house-building, and self-employment workshops were established to provide people with
an altemative polls of subsistence. In short, "the Church. . .resisted the [regime] by
knitting people back together, connecting them as members of one another.'""
However, these efforts were not simply an attempt to address the political needs of a
people. Rather, they were inherently theological, indicative of a Eucharistic dissent
against the discipline of the State. For Cavanaugh,
the Vicaria is Eucharistic because it is not just any body which the church
realizes, but the body ofChiist. Christ's tme body is enacted here by the
incamation of the church in the bodies of the poor. . .the church is the body
of Christ because it performs an anamnesis of Christ's sacrifice, suffering
in its own flesh the afflictions taken on by Christ. . .in the work of the
Vicaria, we see the church breaking out of its confinement to an imagined
realm of the purely 'spiritual' and taking body in space from which it had
been banished. The church becomes visible, obeying the Eucharistic
demand that tme unity be achieved, that people overcome alienation from
each other and become reconciled, caring for each other, especially the
weak, in community and solidarity.'"
The Vicariate of Solidarity represents a faithftil manifestation of the theo-political
ecclesiology presented in the work ofYoder, Hauerwas, and Stringfellow. Its tangible
Ibid.
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manifestation ofGospel eschatology provides a powerful repudiation of the cancerous
theology perpetuated by the Chilean state. However, it must be acknowledged that this
"movement" paradoxically echoed yet subverted the political system in which it was
confined. In its willingness to use the legal system and replace the social service system
ofChile, it signaled its recognition and explicit engagement with the Chile's poHtical
system. And yet, the Vicariate was not primarily a "political" entity. Cavanaugh is clear
in his analysis that while the political services provided by the Vicariate were a vital part
of its dissent firom the Pinochet regime, they could not be understood void its theological
foundations. The Vicariate' s primary identity was not as a separate or distinct "social"
body apart from the State but rather as the enacted "body ofChrist." Pinochet had
embraced the prevailing tradition of Enlightenment liberalism's distortion of the
Christian narrative, refusing the apocalyptic nature of its witness. Following the powers
in Europe and America, it had subordinated the Church's witness to a private sphere in
which ethical discernment remained the purview of civic authorities. In the process, the
regime had engaged in an intentional campaign of torture and "disappearance" by which
all political dissent was violently persecuted. Behind this political movement was an
implicit denial ofGod's sovereignty of his creation. Thus, the Vicariate' s protest against
this development was important in so far as it represented the Church's solidarity with
both "the Other" and by implication the God of liberation. The Vicariate' s mere
existence served as a concrete sign of a theological politics: the God of creation had,
through the incamate Christ, broken into the history of his own creation.
This is not a random event in history, but rather the explicit giving ofhimself to
save his people. The "kingdom of God" is thus a particular, incursive, and demanding
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event in history. It is a dis-ordering of imperial theology. As such, the community called
forth by Christ becomes the agent of this kingdom. It is the ekklesia that represents the
creation of a new order. The Church carries the theo-political message of the Gospel to
the world. It is important to note that Radical Reformation ecclesiology is first and
foremost theological in nature. Its political identity, gleaned from the particular Gospel
ofChrist, is a reflection and incamation of God. Theology is thus its foundation. It
embodies this narrative in a specific way.
The Church's politics is its mere proclamation of an altemative order. When the
people ofGod embody the character of their Lord they are being political. Forgiveness,
community, reconciliation - these are the marks of God's polls. When Watts Street
Baptist Church in Durham, NC "regularly holds prayer vigils at the site of each violent
death in Durham. . .it creates a place for protest and grief in response to the violence that
destroys life.'"" This particular church's lamentation against the violence that pervades
its community -its simple service ofworship and praise - is a political act. When
Archbishop Oscar Romero declared the funeral Mass the only mass to be celebrated
throughout the Archdiocese of El Salvador, following the assassination of Fr. Rutilio
Grande, "he was drawing on the power of the Eucharist to collapse the spatial barriers
separating the rich and the poor, not by surveying the expanse of the Church and
declaring it universal and united, but by gathering the faithful in one particular location
round the alter, and realizing the heavenly universal Catholica in one place, at one
Bmeggemann, 122-123.
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moment, on earth.'"" These hturgical practices ofworship and Eucharist are, as
McCarraher states, the "core" of Christian theological politics. They draw both observer
and participant into the life of God's new creation. This is done so not out of arrogance
or withdrawal from the world, but rather it is a particular expression of identity, done so
in service of the very world that persecutes it. When the Church abandons the
particularities of its narrative, when it seeks to embrace the socio-political ethics of the
State, it rebels against its apocalyptic-missological purpose. The Church is the gathering
of a people who recognize, acknowledge, and submit to Christ's lordship over the
kosmos, and seeks to imitate his life. This is what Radical Reformation ecclesiology is
ftmdamentally about - the Church being the Church, the theo-political altemative ofGod.
It is my argument that this particular ecclesiology is the most faithful to the
Gospel narrative. Further, in speaking into the American liberal context, anarchist
language is perhaps the strongest means of conveying this perspective. In embracing this
particular rhetorical tool the Church is able dynamically to express its dissent against the
imperial theology of the liberal nation-state. Anarchism is thus not an anomaly with
regards to an orthodox Christian theo-politics, but an essential component ofhow the
contemporary Church might declare its allegiance to the sovereign Christ. For those
immersed in the Radical Reformation tradition, it is a vital way to communicate our
theological identity as disciples of an anti-imperial carpenter. The "believer's church"
cannot help but speak the language of anarchy, for in our current context, it is perhaps the
William Cavanaugh, "The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to
Globalization in Catholicism and Catholicity: Eucharistic Communities in Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives ed. Sarah Beckwith (Maiden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 82.
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way only to speak the language of Christological apocalyptic into a world of imperial
powers.
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